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ABSTRACT 
 
The failure event of a structure or lifeline network is often described by a complex logical 
function of multiple component failure events. Despite significant advances in theories on 
reliability analysis of individual components and their adoption in practice, the critical 
knowledge and quantitative methods for reliability assessments of complex system events remain 
elusive, leading to unknown accuracies in the risk assessment. Such a system reliability analysis 
is computationally challenging, especially when the definition of the system event is complex, 
the system has a large number of components, or the component events have significant 
statistical dependence due to common source effects. To overcome these challenges, this study 
develops two system reliability analysis methods, termed the Matrix-based System Reliability 
(MSR) Method and the Sequential Compounding Method (SCM), and applies the methods to 
risk assessment of complex structural systems and lifeline networks. Unlike existing system 
reliability analysis methods, the MSR method is applicable to any general system events, and can 
estimate not only system reliability but also component importance measures and parameter 
sensitivities of system reliability, which are essential metrics for risk-informed decision-making 
processes. The MSR method is applied to a bridge transportation network, a highway bridge 
structural system, and truss structures. The method is further developed to achieve improved 
efficiency using the first- or second-order reliability method; and to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
system failure probability with respect to parameters that affect the statistical dependence 
between the components. These further developments are demonstrated by risk assessment of 
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progressive failures of a generalized Daniels system structure and by finite element system 
reliability analysis of a bridge pylon system. This study also aims at developing new methods for 
stochastic damage detection of pipeline networks based on the MSR method. The methods allow 
for efficient uncertainty quantification of system quantities such as network flow measures and 
for updating the component damage probabilities based on post-disaster observations on network 
performance. The accuracy and efficiency of these methods are demonstrated by a water pipeline 
network with 15 pipes that is subjected to an earthquake event. The sequential compounding 
method (SCM) is also developed to compute the probability of a general system event described 
in terms of a multivariate normal distribution. The merit of the SCM is its superior efficiency 
compared to existing system reliability methods including the MSR method. The accuracy and 
efficiency of the SCM is tested by a wide range of numerical examples including large systems 
consisting of 1,000 components. Due to its wide applicability, accuracy and efficiency, the 
method is expected to enhance the computational capability in various applications of system 
reliability analysis. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Engineers have recognized the presence of uncertainty in the analysis, design, and planning of 
engineering systems and its significant impacts. However, conventional approaches often 
simplify the problem by considering uncertain parameters to be deterministic or by accounting 
for the uncertainties through the use of deterministic safety factors. These approaches may 
incorrectly estimate a required level of safety or satisfactory performance, or provide insufficient 
information for achieving the optimal use of available resources in efforts for maximizing safety. 
In order to overcome this challenge, probabilistic approaches have been developed to consider 
uncertainty in a systematic manner and to provide essential information for risk management and 
optimum design. These efforts provide measures of the risks, safety, and performance of 
engineering systems, and other useful information such as the importance of design parameters 
to their systems, strategies for post hazard inspection and recovery, and plans for optimal 
upgrades under limited financial resources. Thus, these probabilistic approaches have been 
recently adopted in various engineering fields including civil, nuclear, aero-space and 
mechanical engineering.  
A challenge in using these methodologies in practice is the sophistication of the 
probabilistic approach, which requires much more computational effort in order to incorporate 
uncertainties and possible scenarios than the conventional deterministic approach. Moreover, 
integrating the complex nonlinearities of mechanical, structural, and stochastic models adds 
more to the computational costs. To overcome these challenges, a number of probabilistic 
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methodologies have been developed to improve either analytical formulations or sampling 
techniques such as Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). Particularly, analytical methods have been 
well developed for failure events described by a “single” limit state (or a performance criterion), 
such as the First-Order Reliability Method (FORM) and Second-Order Reliability Method 
(SORM), showing superior efficiency to the simulation-based methodologies in most low 
probability problems, and providing various useful byproducts such as parameter sensitivities 
and relative importance measures of random variables.  
In many cases, however, the failure of a structure is described by a Boolean (or logical) 
function of “multiple” limit states. Therefore, the aforementioned probabilistic methodologies 
based on single limit state may not help evaluate the system-level risk accurately. For example, 
consider structural systems such as truss and frame structures that consist of multiple structural 
members. If the risk of having at least one failed member is of concern, the system failure event 
should be described as the union of the failures of the members. Furthermore, if the impact of the 
re-distribution of the loads during the progress of a failure needs to be considered, the system 
failure event will be a complex function of a large number of component limit states. Even if the 
failure of a single structural element is of concern, we may need to consider multiple failure 
modes related to strength (e.g., bending moment or shear) or serviceability (e.g., deflection). One 
can find these multiple limit-states for infrastructure networks such as transportation network or 
gas transmission network, which may experience outage of utility services or disconnections as a 
result of combined failures of structural components in the network. 
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These are often called “system reliability” problems. System reliability analysis 
introduces new computational challenges especially when the definition of the system event is 
complex; the system has a large number of components; or the component events have 
significant statistical dependence. Although various system reliability analysis methods have 
been developed to overcome these challenges, they are still limited in dealing with the 
aforementioned complexity of the problem. Therefore, there are pressing needs for developing 
efficient and accurate system reliability methods that can facilitate risk assessment and 
management of real complex engineering systems.  
 These challenges motivated this Ph.D. research on developing novel methods that can 
quantify the reliability of any general system events efficiently and accurately. The thesis 
introduces the newly developed system reliability methods and their applications to a variety of 
engineering systems. First, Chapter 2 provides a literature review on existing system reliability 
methods including theoretical bounding formulas and analytical system reliability analysis 
methods. Chapter 3 introduces the Matrix based System Reliability (MSR) method developed in 
this study. Chapter 4 demonstrates applications of the MSR method to complex structure systems. 
Chapter 5 further develops the MSR method for efficient system reliability evaluations and 
sensitivities calculations of the system failure probability with respect to the parameters that 
affect the correlation coefficients between the components. Chapter 6 introduces new uncertainty 
quantification and stochastic system damage detection methods for multi damage state systems 
based on the MSR method. Chapter 7 introduces the Sequential Compounding Method (SCM) 
4 
 
that is developed for fast system reliability estimation especially for large-size systems. Chapter 
8 summarizes major findings of this study and provides future research topics. 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review on System Reliability Analysis 
In a system reliability problem, one aims to evaluate the failure probability of a complex 
“system” event that is a Boolean (or logical) function of other “component” events such as the 
occurrences of structural failure modes or the failures of constituent members or substructures. 
For reasonable decision-making on structural designs, retrofits, repairs and damage mitigations, 
it is essential to accurately estimate the likelihood of a system failure event. However, estimating 
the probability of such a system event is often a challenging task due to the complex nature of a 
system reliability problem, which may be comprised of a large number of components, complex 
system event definitions, and statistical dependence between component states. Nevertheless, 
most risk quantification efforts for structural systems have been made by component reliability 
analyses using single limit-states. For example, structural fragility models are often developed 
based on a single component failure event defined in terms of a parameter representing the 
system status, e.g. “engineering demand parameter” (Cornell and Krawinkler 2000; Der 
Kiureghian 2005). This is mostly because computing the probability of such a system event is 
often costly or unfeasible due to the complexity of the system and/or the lack of information. 
  In an effort to overcome these challenges, a number of system reliability analysis 
methods have been developed. One approach is to obtain bounds on the system failure 
probability based on marginal component probabilities and/or low-order joint failure 
probabilities. First-order theoretical bounding formulas were developed for series and parallel 
systems (Boole 1854; Ang and Amin 1967). Because it only requires the information of uni-
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component probabilities, it gives quite wide bounds which may not be sufficient for practical use. 
Later, the second-order and third-order bounding formulas have been developed to provide 
narrower bounds (Kounias 1968; Hunter 1976; Ditlevsen 1979; Hohenbichler and Rackwitz 
1983; Ditlevsen and Bjerager 1984; Zhang 1993). These narrower bounds have been widely used 
for various applications, including frame structures and infrastructures (Mahadevan and Xiao 
1993, Monti and Camillo 1996; Voortman and Vrijling 2001). They were also used for the 
reliability based design optimization (Ba-abbad et al. 2006; Liang et al. 2007; MacDonald and 
Mahadevan 2008).  
 However, these theoretical bounding formulas are applicable to only parallel or series 
system, and are not available for general systems (non-parallel and non-series system). Some of 
the formulas depend on the numbering choices of components as well. These cannot be used 
when some of the marginal or joint component probabilities are not available. In order to 
overcome these limitations, Song and Der Kiureghian (2003a) proposed a method for computing 
the bounds on system failure probability by use of linear programming (LP). This “LP bounds” 
method subdivides the sample space into mutually exclusive events and describes the system 
probability and available information by use of vectors representing the subdivided areas. The 
lower and upper bounds of the system failure probability are then obtained by solving LP 
problems. This matrix-based framework of system reliability analysis provides the narrowest 
possible bounds on the probability of any general systems with significantly enhanced flexibility 
in incorporating available information. It has been applied to a variety of system reliability 
problems, e.g., system reliability assessment of electrical substations (Song and Der Kiureghian 
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2003b; Der Kiureghian and Song 2008), and the stability of rock slopes (Jimenez-Rodrigueza et 
al. 2006).  
 Although these bounding approaches can provide narrow bounds that are useful for 
decision-making, there is still a need for obtaining an accurate point estimate of the system 
failure probability because the bounds may not be convenient in identifying relative importance 
of components, computing parameter sensitivities of system reliability and performing system 
reliability based design optimizations.  
 For this purpose, the Matrix based System Reliability (MSR) approach has been 
developed in this thesis, which provides the point estimate of the probability of a general system 
event and its parameter sensitivities accurately and efficiently. The details of the developed 
method and its application examples are introduced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively. The 
MSR method allows us to compute the sensitivities of system probability with respect to its 
parameters (Song and Kang 2009), which are useful in risk/loss assessment, decision-making 
processes for more reliable systems, and reliability-based design optimization. The method can 
be also used to obtain the probability distribution functions of the uncertain number of failed 
components and the network flow quantities. Given the observed events, the conditional 
probabilities of component/system failures can also be evaluated. These conditional probabilities 
are useful for quantifying the relative importance of the components with respect to a system 
event of interest. These merits of the MSR method have been demonstrated through its 
applications to risk assessment of structural systems (Song and Kang 2008, 2009), post-hazard 
connectivity analysis of lifeline networks (Kang et al. 2008, Song et al. 2008), post-hazard 
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network flow capacity analysis (Lee et al. 2009), and system reliability based design/topology 
optimization (Nguyen et al. 2009).  
These application examples helped identify the following limitations of the method: (1) 
If a large number of CSRVs are needed for accurate fitting by use of a generalized DS correlation 
model (Song and Kang 2009), the numerical integration in the CSRV space can be inefficient. 
Therefore, for rapid risk assessment, one may need to tolerate a certain level of fitting error. 
However, the impacts of the fitting error on the accuracy of the system failure probabilities are 
not known in general; (2) If direct numerical integration is used in the CSRV space, the method 
becomes inefficient as the number of CSRVs are increased for more accurate evaluation; and (3) 
Matrix-based procedures for obtaining parameter sensitivities of system failure probability are 
needed also for parameters that affect the correlation coefficients between the components. 
To overcome these limitations, two further developments of the MSR method are 
introduced in Chapter 5: first, a method is proposed to evaluate the integral in a large-
dimensional CSRV space in an efficient manner by use of the first- or second-order reliability 
methods (FORM/SORM). Second, a new matrix-based procedure is developed to compute the 
sensitivity of the system failure probability with respect to parameters that affect the correlation 
coefficients between components.  
Lee et al. (2011) generalized the MSR method for efficient uncertainty quantification of 
the post-hazard network flow capacity. This non-simulation based method can be applied to any 
general system to obtain probability functions and statistical parameters of the system quantity of 
interest by matrix calculations. However, the size of the vectors used by the MSR method 
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increases exponentially as the number of components increases, which requires high 
computational costs and memory. To overcome this, a new method is proposed in Chapter 6 to 
construct the vectors efficiently without compromising accuracy, using a selective search scheme 
that is often seen in identifying critical failure modes of complex structural systems (Murotsu 
1984, Guenard 1984). In addition, a Bayesian stochastic damage detection method is developed 
to compute the conditional probabilities of component damage given post-disaster network flow 
observations, based on the Bayesian framework introduced in Poulakis et al. (2003) and the MSR 
method.  
Despite of these advances, the MSR method still has restrictions such that the size of the 
problem increases exponentially with the number of the components. For more efficient system 
reliability analysis of general system events in a large-size general system, the Sequential 
Compounding Method (SCM) is developed (Chapter 7). It is based on the first-order system 
reliability method (Hohenbichler and Rackwitz 1983) which transforms system reliability 
problems into the following multivariate normal integral based on the results of component 
reliability analyses: 
T 1
/2
( ) ( ; )
1 1exp
2(2 ) det
sys n
n
P E d
d



 
     


z R z
z R z z
R
 (2.1) 
where sysE  is the system event of interest;   denotes the domain of a system event defined in 
the space of n standard normal random variables Z ; ( )n   is the joint probability density 
function (PDF) of Z ; R  is the correlation coefficient matrix of Z ; and det R  denotes the 
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determinant of R . For example, if the system failure event is defined as 1 2 3( )sysE E E E   , 
the domain   is determined as 
1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3{( , , ) | [( ) ( )] ( )}z z z z z z          (2.2) 
where i  denotes the reliability index of the i-th component event, 1, 2,3i  . For these so-
called multivariate normal (or multinormal) integrals, many methods have already been 
developed for computing point estimates, including first order approaches to multivariate normal 
integration (FOMN) (Hohenbichler and Rackwitz 1983; Tang and Melchers 1987), sequentially 
conditioned importance sampling (SCIS) (Ambartzumian et al. 1998), the product of conditional 
marginal (PCM) method (Pandey 1998; Pandey and Sarkar 2002; Yuan and Pandey 2006), and 
quasi Monte Carlo simulation methods employing transformation and conditional expectations 
(Genz 1992, 1993; Joe 2002). However, these existing system reliability analysis methods are 
applicable to parallel systems (i.e., intersection of component events) or series systems (i.e., 
union of component events) only and inflexible in incorporating various types and amount of 
available information on components and their statistical dependence. Moreover, the complexity 
of a system event makes the reliability computations more complicated or time-consuming. 
 One of the few methods developed for non-series or non-parallel system problems can 
be found in the software RELSYS (Estes and Frangopol 1998). The method estimates the system 
probability using the concept of “equivalent component” (Gollwitzer and Rackwitz 1983), which 
sequentially replaces sub-series or sub-parallel systems into equivalent normal components until 
the system is simplified to a single equivalent component. In this method, individual component 
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reliability indexes and the correlation coefficients between components are evaluated by FORM, 
first. The reliability indexes of the equivalent components are then estimated by use of a 
multivariate normal integral evaluation method while the equivalent directional cosines are 
approximately obtained by a finite difference method. It is known that this method provides 
accurate results for parallel systems with five or fewer components. However, it may result in 
significant error for series systems consisting of components with the same reliability indexes 
(Estes and Frangopol 1998), and the errors may accumulate as the size of a general system 
increases.  
The Sequential Compounding Method (SCM) in Chapter 7 overcomes most of the 
restrictions in the existing multivariate normal integration methods and the size issue in the MSR 
method for multivariate normal integrations. It can be applied to general system events including 
series, parallel, cut-set and link-set systems, and its accuracy is not significantly affected by the 
large number of components in a system. The accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method, 
and its applicability to various types and sizes of multivariate normal integrals are demonstrated 
by numerical examples. 
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Chapter 3  Matrix based System Reliability (MSR) Method 
3.1. Methodology 
Consider a system event whose i-th component has id  distinct states, .,,1 ni   The sample 
space can be subdivided into 1
n
i im d   mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
(MECE) events. These are termed the “basic” MECE events and denoted by ,je  .,,1 mj   
Then, any system event can be represented by an “event” vector c  whose j-th element is 1 if 
je  belongs to the system event and 0 otherwise. Let ),( jj ePp   ,,,1 mj   denote the 
probability of .je  Due to the mutual exclusiveness of je ’s, the probability of the system event 
,sysE  i.e., )( sysEP  is the sum of the probabilities of je ’s that belong to the system event. 
Therefore, the system probability is computed by the inner product of the two vectors, that is, 
T
:
( )
j sys
sys sys j
j e E
P E P p

   c p  (3.1) 
where p  is the “probability” vector that contains jp ’s, .,,1 mj   Both c  and p  are 
given as column vectors in this thesis. The formulation in Eq. (3.1) can be generalized to 
compute the probabilities of multiple system events under multiple conditions of component 
failures by a single matrix multiplication, i.e., PCP Tsys  where sysP  is the matrix whose 
element at the i-th row and the j-th column is the probability of the i-th system event under the j-
th condition, ]   [ 21 sysNcccC   is the matrix containing the event vectors of the sysN  system 
events considered, and ]   [ 21 condNpppP   is the matrix that has the probability vectors of the 
condN  different component conditions.  This was named a Matrix-based System Reliability 
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(MSR) method (Kang et al. 2008, Song and Kang 2009). This matrix-based framework has been 
further developed for considering general multi-state components and for describing the 
uncertainty in the system-related quantity such as network flow capacity (Lee et al. 2009). 
The MSR method has the following merits over existing system reliability methods. 
First, the system reliability computation is always performed by a simple inner product 
regardless of the type of a system event, so the complexity of a system event does not make the 
system reliability calculation more complicated or costly. Second, matrix-based procedures are 
available for identifying and handling the system events conveniently and for constructing the 
probability vector efficiently. Third, even if one has incomplete information on the component 
failure probabilities and/or their statistical dependence, the matrix-based framework still enables 
us to obtain the narrowest possible bounds on any general system event. This is equivalent to the 
LP bounds method (Song and Der Kiureghian 2003a). Fourth, one can calculate the conditional 
probabilities and various importance measures (Song and Der Kiureghian 2005) using the MSR 
method without introducing additional complexity. Finally, the MSR method can take advantage 
of the recent developments of matrix-based computer languages and software applications 
including MATLAB® and Octave, which rendered matrix calculations more efficient and easier 
to implement. 
A drawback of the MSR method is that the size of vectors and matrices increase 
exponentially with the number of component events, which may require enormous capacity of 
computing memory especially for systems with a large number of components. However, this 
can be overcome by transforming a large system problem into multiple system problems with 
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fewer components. For example, a multi-scale approach may be used by representing groups of 
components as “super-components” (Der Kiureghian and Song 2008, Song and Ok 2010). One 
may also try to describe the system event in terms of disjoint cut-sets or link-sets identified by 
use of an efficient algorithm (Li and He 2002; Menun 2004; Lim and Song 2011) so that the 
MSR method is used for computing the probability of each disjoint cut-set or link-set that has 
fewer component events than the original system. 
For small-size systems, the event vector c  can be identified directly. However, this 
approach may become intractable as the size of the system increases. An important merit of the 
MSR method is that one can construct the event vector of a system event by simple matrix 
manipulations of the event vectors of components or other system events. In order to construct 
the event vector for the system event of interest, the event vectors of the components are first 
identified. Consider an iterative matrix procedure 
[1]
1
0
    C , 
[ 1]
[ ]
[ 1]
i
i
i


    
C 1
C
C 0
 for ni ,,3,2   (3.2) 
where 0  and 1  denote the column vectors of 12 i  zeros and ones, respectively. When the 
iterative procedure is completed, the i-th column of ][nC  is the event vector of the i-th 
component event, iEc . The event vector of the system event is then obtained by matrix-based 
procedures employing the event vectors of components as follows:  
 1 1 2
1 1 2
.* .* .*
( ).*( ).* .*( )
n n
n n
E E
E E EE E
E E EE E
 

    
c 1 c
c c c c
c 1 1 c 1 c 1 c




 (3.3) 
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where 1  denotes a vector of 1’s that has the same size as the event vector, and “.*” represents 
element-by-element multiplication of two vectors. Using a matrix-based language, one can 
perform the calculations in Eq. (3.3) efficiently by simple single-line expressions. 
If the system event has not been identified as a Boolean description due to the 
complexity of the system or a large number of cut-sets or link-sets, one can develop or utilize a 
problem-specific computer algorithm to construct the event vector directly from the vectors of 
components or other system events using the matrix manipulations in Eq. (3.3). When only a 
subset of cut-sets or link-sets is identified, an MSR analysis employing the event vector based on 
the subset provides lower or upper bounds on the system probability. 
The probability vector p  can be constructed by efficient matrix manipulations as well. 
Let us first consider a system whose component failure probabilities are all available and the 
component events are statistically independent of each other. In this case, each element of the 
probability vector is easily computed as the product of the probabilities of components or their 
complementary events that include the corresponding basic MECE events. However, if the 
probability vector is constructed by computing each element one by one, it can be a time-
consuming task especially for a system with many components. The following matrix-based 
procedure was proposed to construct probability vectors efficiently: 
T
[1] 1 1
[ 1]
[ ]
[ 1]
for 2,3,...,i ii
i i
P P
P
i n
P


   
    
p
p
p
p
 (3.4) 
16 
 
where [ ],ip  ni ,...,1  denotes the probability vector for a system with component events 
};,,1{ i  iP  denotes the probability of the i-th component; and .1 ii PP   This matrix-based 
procedure can construct the probability vectors much more efficiently than element-wise 
computations. In a numerical test using Matlab® (Kang et al. 2008), the CPU time to construct 
the probability vector for a system with 20 components were 1,219.0 sec by the element-wise 
calculations while it took only 0.0629 sec by the procedure in Eq. (3.4). 
The matrix-procedures in Eq. (3.2)-(3.4) are explained by an example system with three 
independent components, 1 2 3( )sysE E E E  . First, we construct the probability vector p  from 
Eq. (3.4), that is, 
1
[1]
1
,
P
P
    
p ,
21
21
21
21
]2[













PP
PP
PP
PP
p  and 

























321
321
321
321
321
321
321
321
]3[
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
p  (3.5) 
where [3]p  is the probability vector p  of the system. Next, the event vectors of the 
components are found by Eq. (3.2): 
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[1]
1
,
0
    C ,
00
01
10
11
]2[








C  and 

















000
001
010
011
100
101
110
111
]3[C  (3.6) 
where the first, second, and third columns of ]3[C  are the component event vectors, ,1
Ec  ,2Ec  
and .3Ec  From Eq. (3.3), the system event vector is constructed as 
1 2 3 31 2( ) ( ).*( ) .*E E E EE E     c 1 1 c 1 c c  (3.7) 
Finally, we compute the system probability by the inner product of the system event vector and 
the probability vector, 
1 2 3
T( )
[3]( )
E E E
sysP E    c p   (3.8) 
If some component probabilities are missing or only their bounds are known, it is impossible to 
construct the probability vector completely. In such cases, the matrix-based system formulation 
still enables us to obtain the narrowest possible bounds on the probability of a system event by 
solving the following LP problems: 
T
1 1
2 2
3 3
minimize (maximize)
subject to 


c p
A p b
A p b
A p b
  (3.9) 
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where 1A , 2A  and 3A  denote the matrices whose rows are the event vectors for which exact 
probabilities or bounds are available; and 1b , 2b  and 3b  are the vectors of available 
probabilities and lower/upper bounds. This “LP bounds method” has been successfully applied to 
structural systems, lifeline networks, and multiple structures under stochastic excitations (Song 
and Der Kiureghian 2003a; 2003b; 2006). This can be also useful when the component events 
are statistically dependent, and one may afford to calculate low-order joint probabilities only. 
 In order to measure the relative importance of components or cut-sets, many importance 
measures have been introduced and used in the system engineering community. Song and Der 
Kiureghian (2005) reviewed several importance measures including Fussell-Vesely’s (Fussell, 
1973) and proposed methods to compute them by the LP bounds method. Kang et al. (2008) 
proposed to use the conditional probability of the component event given the system failure as an 
importance measure of the component. The conditional probability importance measure (CIM) of 
the i-th component iE  is defined as 
( )
( | )
( )
i sys
i i sys
sys
P E E
CIM P E E
P E
   (3.10) 
Most of importance measures – including CIM – are defined as the ratio of the probability of a 
new system event sysE   to that of the system event of interest .sysE  Therefore in the MSR 
formulation, an importance measure is computed by 
T T( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )sys sysP E P E  c p c p  (3.11) 
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where c  is the event vector of .sysE  Note that once the MSR analysis is performed for the 
system event of interest, the only significant task required additionally is to find the event vector 
for the new system event sysE   by use of simple matrix manipulations in Eq. (3.3). 
3.2. MSR Analysis for Component Events under Statistical Dependence 
When component events are statistically dependent, it may be a daunting task to construct the 
probability vector p  because the basic MECE events cannot be computed simply by products 
of probabilities of components and their complementary events. In many structural system 
reliability problems, however, we can achieve conditional independence between component 
events given outcomes of a few random variables representing the sources of “environmental 
dependence” or “common source effects” (Cornell 1967). 
 Let S  denote the vector containing such random variables, named “common source 
random variables (CSRV).” By the total probability theorem, the system failure probability can 
be computed as 
( | ) ( )sys sysP P E f d  ss s s s   (3.12) 
where ( | )sysP E s  denotes the conditional probability of the system event given an outcome of 
CSRV, i.e., ;S s  and ( )fs s  is the joint probability density function (PDF) of .S  Using the 
proposed MSR formulation in Eq. (3.1), one can compute the system failure probability in Eq. 
(3.12) as 
T ( ) ( )sysP f d  ss c p s s s   (3.13) 
20 
 
where ( )p s  is the vector of the conditional probabilities of the basic MECE events given .S s  
Due to the conditional independence of the components given S s , one can construct ( )p s  
efficiently by the matrix-based procedure in Eq. (3.4). When the system has a relatively large 
number of CSRVs, the system probability in Eq. (3.13) can be computed by use of an efficient 
integration algorithm. For example, Kang et al. (2008) used the MSR method for estimating the 
likelihood of disconnections in a bridge network. Using a deterministic attenuation law with a 
specific seismic source and assuming that the statistical dependence between the capacities of 
bridges at different locations is insignificant, the uncertain earthquake magnitude was considered 
the only CSRV in the example. 
 The system event definition, represented by the event vector c , is not affected by the 
outcome of .S  Therefore, one can alternatively compute the system failure probability in Eq. 
(3.13) as 
T T( ) ( )sysP f d  ssc p s s s c p  (3.14) 
The integration for the “predictive probability vector” p~  is more expensive than the one in Eq. 
(3.13) especially when a system has large number of components. However, this approach is 
useful when we consider various system events at once because the predictive probability vector 
needs to be computed only once and can be reused for any new system event. 
 The approach in Eqs. (3.13)–(3.14) can be used even when CSRVs are not explicitly 
identified. One way to identify such implicit common source effect is to describe the correlation 
coefficients between basic random variables or safety margins (or factors) by use of a special 
21 
 
correlation matrix model such as Dunnett-Sobel (DS) class (Dunnett and Sobel 1955). Suppose 
iZ , ,,...,1 ni   are DS class standard normal random variables. This means the correlation 
coefficient between iZ  and jZ  is specified as jiij rr   for ji   and .1 ii  Then, 
iZ ’s can be represented by )1( n  independent standard normal random variables: 
21i i i iZ r U rS     (3.15) 
where S  and ,iU  ni ,...,1  are independent standard normal random variables. For a given 
outcome ,S s  therefore, iZ ’s are conditionally independent of each other. If the safety 
margins or the limit state functions of component events are represented as or transformed to DS 
class random variables, we can identify the common source effect by the single random variable 
.S  One special example is that the components are equally correlated, i.e., , ij  for which 
.ir  
 For a general correlation coefficient matrix, one can try to fit it with a DS class by 
finding a set of sri '  that minimizes the errors between the actual correlations ij  and .ji rr   
In case the differences between the correlation coefficients results in significant errors in system 
reliability estimations, one can generalize the DS class by adding more CSRVs. When m  
CSRVs, ,kS  mk ,...,1  are used to improve the fitting accuracy, iZ ’s are represented as 
2
1 1
1
m m
i ik i ik k
k k
Z r U r S
 
      (3.16) 
In this case, the correlation coefficient between iZ  and jZ  is derived as 
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)(1 jkik
m
kij rr    for ji   and 1ii   (3.17) 
Applying the condition S s  into Eq. (3.16), we can compute the probabilities of conditionally 
independent components, ( | )iP E s  or ( )iP s , which is used in Eq. (3.14). 
 If a given correlation matrix R  is not described exactly by use of the generalized DS 
class, one can find a DS correlation matrix DSR  that has the minimum error by the following 
optimization:  
  * arg min ( )DSnorm 
r
r R R r  (3.18) 
where r  denotes the matrix of ikr  for ,,...,1 ni  and mk ,...,1 ; arg min{}  denotes the 
argument that minimize the function; ( )norm   denotes the Euclidean norm of a matrix; and 
DSR  is constructed by Eq. (3.17). Then, one can approximate the original correlation 
coefficient matrix R  by *( )DSR r . This optimization problem involves the following 
constraints: 
2
1
1 0
m
ik
k
r

    (3.19) 
and  
1 1ikr     (3.20) 
This optimization process was termed as “DS fitting,” and  R RDSnorm  in Eq. (3.18) is 
called “DS fitting error.” 
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3.3. Parameter Sensitivity of System Reliability by MSR Method 
For a systematic decision making based on risk-quantification, it is helpful to estimate the 
sensitivities of failure probability fP  with respect to design parameters. For example, the 
sensitivities with respect to the means of random variables can help achieve optimal designs 
while those with respect to the standard deviations are critical in efforts for uncertainty 
management or quality control. The following sensitivity-based importance measures are often 
used to quantify the importance of the uncertain design variables in terms of design change and 
uncertainty management, respectively. 
f
i i
i
f
i i
i
P
P
  
  
  (3.21) 
where i  and i  respectively denote the mean and standard deviation of the i-th design 
variable. Der Kiureghian et al. (2007) proposed the following sensitivity-based importance 
measure named “upgrade worth” for quantifying the worth of fixed-cost upgrade options: 
i
f
i
i
P
I
     
  (3.22) 
where i  is the i-th design parameter and i  is the variation in i  that can be achieved by a 
fixed cost increment. 
 When the risk is represented by a system event rather than a single component, it is 
necessary to compute the sensitivities of the “system” probability sysP  with respect to design 
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parameters. The closed-form expressions for sensitivities of multi-normal probabilities are 
available for parallel and series systems (Ditlevsen and Madsen, 1996). However, the 
formulation is complicated and not applicable to general systems. Sues and Cesare (2005) 
proposed a method to compute the sensitivities of the system failure probability based on Monte 
Carlo Simulations (MCS) employing closed-form component limit-state functions approximated 
by first- or second-order reliability methods (FORM/SORM). Song and Der Kiureghian (2005) 
used the LP bounds method to obtain the lower and upper bounds on the sensitivities of general 
systems in case complete information is not available or affordable. In this study, an analytical 
method based on the MSR framework is proposed as follows in order to efficiently compute 
parameter sensitivities of general system reliability. 
 Consider the system failure probability in Eq. (3.1) when the components are 
statistically independent. Since the system event definition is independent of the change in the 
design parameters, the sensitivity of the system failure probability is computed as 
TsysP  
pc   (3.23) 
where   is a design parameter of interest. It is noteworthy that the sensitivity is computed in a 
uniform manner for any general system events because the system event description and the 
probability calculations are separated in the MSR framework. The second term in the inner 
product can be computed efficiently by the following matrix-based procedure: 
 1 2 ˆn          
p P Pp p p P  (3.24) 
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where ,ip  ni ,...,1  is the same as the probability vector ][np  in Eq. (3.4) except that 1 
and 1   are used instead of iP  and iP  during the vector construction process; and 
T
21 ][ nPPP P  is the vector of the marginal component probabilities. In summary, the MSR 
framework allows us to efficiently compute the sensitivity of the probability of any system 
events by the matrix-based procedure in Eq. (3.4) and the component sensitivities ./  iP  
 Extending Eqs. (3.23)–(3.24) to a vector of m  design parameters 
,][ T21 m   the gradient vector (row vector) of the system failure probability is 
computed as 
T
,
ˆ
sysP θ P θc P J   (3.25) 
where ,P θJ  is the Jacobian matrix of P  with respect to .  If the system failure probability is 
computed by Eq. (3.13) due to the statistical dependence between the components, the system 
sensitivity is computed as 
T ( ) ( )( ) ( )sys
P ff d
         sss
p s sc s p s s  (3.26) 
where ( )p s  and ( ) / p s  are computed by efficient procedures in Eqs. (3.4) and (3.24), 
respectively at a given S s  during the numerical integration. If none of the CSRVs is related 
to the design parameter ,  the second term in the bracket becomes zero. The first term in the 
bracket can be readily calculated using the proper chain rule. However, when the design 
parameter   has an effect on the correlation of components, ( ) / p s  requires the calculation 
of /ij   and /ikr  , but they are generally not available from component reliability 
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analysis. This limitation will be overcome by the further development of the MSR method in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4  Applications of MSR Method 
4.1. System Fragility of a Bridge Structure 
“Fragility” is defined as the conditional probability that a structure will exceed a specified limit-
state for a given level of loading intensity. For example, Nielson and DesRoches (2007a; 2007b) 
developed analytical fragility curves of major components of highway bridges (see Figure 4.1 for 
illustrations of major bridge components). Let iC  and iD  respectively denote the seismic 
capacity and demand of the i-th component of a bridge. If we assume both random variables 
follow the lognormal distributions, the safety factor iii DCF lnln   is a normal random 
variable. Then, the fragility of the i-th component with respect to a limit state iLS  is derived as 
( | ) ( 0 | )
                    
( )
                    
( )
i
i
i
i
i i
F
i
F
F
F
P LS IM P F IM
P Z IM
IM
IM
 
      
      
 (4.1) 
where IM  is a given ground motion intensity measure such as peak ground acceleration 
(PGA); 
ii FFii
FZ  /)(  is the standardized safety factor; 
iF
  and 
iF
  respectively 
denote the mean and standard deviation of the safety factor; and    is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function (CDF). The parameters required for obtaining 
iF
  and 
iF
  at 
a given IM  were determined for major components of highway bridge systems typical to the 
28 
 
Central and Southeastern United States. The required parameters include those related to the 
probabilistic seismic demand model by Cornell et al. (2002).  
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Figure 4.1  Illustration of major bridge components (Nielson 2005). 
 
The correlation coefficients between the natural logarithms of the demands of different bridge 
components were identified as well. Then, the conditional probabilities of system events, i.e., 
“system fragilities” were computed by MCS employing component fragility models and the 
identified correlation coefficients. Based on a parametric study, the correlation coefficients were 
assumed to be constant over the considered range of seismic intensity. As an example, Figure 4.2 
shows the analytical component/system fragility curves of a multi-span, simply-supported 
(MSSS) steel girder bridge for the “Slight Damage” limit state (Nielson 2005). The system 
failure was defined as an event that at least one component exceeds its corresponding limit-state. 
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This is a series system with 8 component events. A total of 10,000 MCS were performed for each 
of the selected PGA values to compute the system failure probabilities. The system fragility 
curve was then obtained by fitting the lognormal CDF to the MCS results. 
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Figure 4.2  Component and system fragility curves of MSSS steel girder bridge for “Slight 
Damage” (Notations - Fxd: fixed bearing, Exp: expansion bearing, Long: 
longitudinal loading, Tran: transverse loading, Ab: abutment, Pass: passive, and 
Act: active) 
 
The same system fragility in the example is hereby computed by use of the MSR method instead 
of MCS. The correlation coefficient between the standardized safety factors iZ  and jZ  is 
derived as 
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 , ln ,ln2 2 1/2 2 2 1/2
( )
( ) / ( )
i j
i j i j i j
i i j j
D D
Z Z F F D D
C D C D
             (4.2) 
where 
iC
  and 
iD
  respectively denote the standard deviations of iCln  and ;ln iD  and 
ji DD ln,ln
  is the correlation coefficient between the natural logarithms of the demands. Table 4.1 
shows the computed correlation coefficients 
jiZZ
 . We find a DS class correlation matrix that 
fits the correlation coefficients 
ji ZZ ,
ρ  with the least sum-of-squared-errors. The approximated 
correlation matrix is provided in Table 4.2 for comparison. Although only one random variable is 
used to represent the common source effect, the correlation matrix is described by a DS class 
matrix with small errors. 
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Table 4.1  Correlation coefficient matrix for standardized safety factors of MSSC bridge 
components 
 
 Column 
Fxd-
Long 
Fxd-
Tran 
Exp-
Long 
Exp-
Tran 
Ab-Pass Ab-Act Ab-Tran 
Column 1.00 0.571 0.510 0.409 0.508 0.483 0.294 0.292 
Fxd-
Long 
 1.00 0.839 0.577 0.820 0.777 0.463 0.491 
Fxd-Tran   1.00 0.506 0.844 0.672 0.419 0.469 
Exp-
Long 
   1.00 0.506 0.486 0.282 0.298 
Exp-
Tran 
    1.00 0.644 0.404 0.457 
Ab-Pass  Symmetric   1.00 0.423 0.419 
Ab-Act       1.00 0.266 
Ab-Tran        1.00 
 
Table 4.2  Correlation coefficient matrix for standardized safety factors of MSSC bridge 
components approximated by DS class 
 
 Column 
Fxd-
Long 
Fxd-
Tran 
Exp-
Long 
Exp-
Tran 
Ab-Pass Ab-Act Ab-Tran 
Column 1.00 0.575 0.528 0.361 0.517 0.482 0.295 0.312 
Fxd-
Long 
 1.00 0.838 0.573 0.820 0.765 0.467 0.494 
Fxd-Tran   1.00 0.527 0.754 0.703 0.430 0.455 
Exp-
Long 
   1.00 0.515 0.481 0.294 0.311 
Exp-
Tran 
    1.00 0.688 0.421 0.445 
Ab-Pass  Symmetric   1.00 0.392 0.415 
Ab-Act       1.00 0.254 
Ab-Tran        1.00 
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The system fragility is then computed by Eq. (3.12) in which the marginal PDF of the standard 
normal distribution is used for ( ).f s  The event vector c  for the series system event with 8 
components is obtained by Eq. (3.3). For a given outcome of CSRV, i.e., ,S s  the conditional 
probability vector ( )sp  is constructed by Eq. (3.4) with iP  replaced by the conditional 
probability of the i-th component failure given .S s  From Eqs. (3.15) and (4.1), this 
conditional probability is derived as 
 
2
2
,
1
                              
1
i i
i i
i
i i
i
r sP LS S s IM P U
r
rs
r
        
       
 (4.3) 
where ).(/)( IMIM
ii FFi
  Figure 4.3 compares the system fragility computed by the MSR 
method with that by MCS and the fitted lognormal CDF. The plot shows good agreement 
between the results by MSR and MCS despite the approximation made by representing the 
original correlation matrix by a DS class correlation matrix. The MSR method provides good 
performance even at the range of small probability while the fitted lognormal CDF shows 
significant errors. 
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Figure 4.3   System fragility curves of MSSS steel girder bridge for “Slight Damage.” 
 
 For decision making related to hazard-preparedness, one may need to know the 
probability that a certain number of components will fail during an earthquake event, which is a 
complex system event. For example, the event that exactly two components fail is described by 
28 cut-sets, i.e., 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8          
sysE E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
E E E E E E E E
   

 (4.4) 
where iE  denotes the event that the i-th component fails. Using the matrix-based procedure in 
Eq. (3.3), one can conveniently find the event vector for this new system event using the event 
vectors of iE ’s. Since the probability vector ( )sp  is already available from the previous system 
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reliability analysis, finding the new event vector is the only additional task for the system 
reliability analysis. Using the computed probabilities that k components fails, ,8,...,1k  the 
probabilities that at least k  component fails are computed and shown in Figure 4.4. 
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 Figure 4.4  Probabilities that at least k bridge components fail, .8,...,1k  
 
 In order to identify important component events, the CIMs in Eq. (3.10) are computed 
by the MSR method. The only additional task is to find the event vector for sysi EE  by use of Eq. 
(3.3). Figure 4.5 shows the CIMs of the bridge components at three different PGA levels, 0.2, 0.6 
and 1.0. It is noteworthy that the relative importance of component events depends on the 
intensity of ground motion. At the low intensity level (PGA=0.2), the relative importance of the 
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weakest component stands out while five component events are identified important at the high 
intensity level (PGA = 1.0). 
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Figure 4.5  Conditional probability importance measures (CIM) of bridge components at PGA 
= 0.2, 0.6 and 1.0g. 
 
4.2. Progressive Failure of a Statically Indeterminate Structure 
As an example application of the MSR method to progressive failure of a structure, a statically 
indeterminate truss structure subject to an abnormal load is considered (see Figure 4.6). Each 
member is assumed to be perfectly brittle and its cross sectional area A  and Young’s modulus 
E  are 4,500 mm2 and 8100.2   kN/m2, respectively. The member force capacities iC , 
PGA=0.2 
PGA=0.6 
PGA=1.0 
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6,...,1i  are equi-correlated normal random variables with mean 1,000 kN, standard deviation 
200 kN and correlation coefficient 0.2. The statistical dependence is exactly represented by a DS 
class correlation structure in Eq. (3.15) with .2.0ir  Assuming only the member capacities 
have significant uncertainties given an abnormal load, the common source effect in the system is 
exactly represented by a standard normal random variable. 
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   =   
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Figure 4.6  Statically indeterminate truss structure under an abnormal load. 
 
The truss structure collapses when at least two members fail due to excessive demands on 
member forces. In other words, the system survives if (1) no member fails in the original 
configuration or (2) one member fails but no further member failures take place. The complexity 
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of estimating the likelihood of this system event arises from the fact that the load is re-distributed 
after member failures, and therefore the failures of remaining members should be described as 
new component events. Figure 4.7 shows the indices of the component failure events defined for 
the original structure and the structures with one failed member. Using these component indices, 
the probability of survival, i.e., system reliability is described as 
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 13 14 15 16
1 2 3 4 5 6 17 18 19 20 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 22 23 24 25 26
1 2 3 4 5 6 27 28
( ) [
          ( )( ) ( )( ) 
          ( )( ) ( )( )
          ( )(
sysP E P E E E E E E
E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
E E E E E E E E
 
 
 
29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 32 33 34 35 36) ( )( )]E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
 (4.5) 
This is a general (link-set) system with 36 components. One can obtain the corresponding event 
vector by the matrix calculations in Eq. (3.3). The system reliability is computed by Eq. (3.13) 
for which the marginal PDF of the standard normal distribution is used for ( ).f s  For a given 
outcome of CSRV, i.e., ,S s  ( )sp  is constructed by Eq. (3.4) with iP  replaced by the 
conditional probability that the member capacity is less than the member force in the i-th 
component given .S s  
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Figure 4.7 Indices of component failure events defined for the original structure and the 
structures with one failed member. 
 
Taking advantage of the mutual exclusiveness of the 7 link-sets and the perfect correlation 
between component events defined for the same member in each link-set, e.g., 2E  and 7E , the 
system event is subdivided to seven smaller systems with six components each. The system 
reliability is then computed as 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 7 8 9 0 6 2 12 3 4 5 16
3 17 2 4 5 21 4 22 2 3 5 26 5 27 2 3 4 31
6 1 33 34 35 36
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
   ( ) ( ) ( )
  ( )
sys lP E P E E E E E E P E E E E E E P E E E E E E
P E E E E E E P E E E E E E P E E E E E E
P E E E E E E
  
  

 (4.6) 
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As a result of this system decomposition, the size of the event/probability vectors drastically 
reduces from 1036 1087.62   to .6426   Figure 4.8 shows the conditional probabilities of the 
collapse given external loads computed by the MSR method and those by MCS (1,000 samples 
at each of the selected load levels). A large number of MCS are required to achieve convergence 
on the small probabilities. By contrast, the MSR method exactly estimates probabilities at any 
range without additional computational cost. 
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Figure 4.8  Conditional probabilities of collapse given an external load. 
 
For an optimal system upgrade, important members need to be identified based on the 
sensitivities of the system failure probability with respect to the means and standard deviations of 
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the member capacities. The sensitivities are computed using Eq. (3.26) with the other 
parameters fixed. The sensitivities of the probability vector with respect to the considered 
parameters, i.e.,  /p  are computed by the proposed procedure in Eq. (3.24) employing the 
sensitivities of the component failure probabilities with respect to .  These component 
sensitivities can be derived analytically (Song and Der Kiureghian 2005). The sensitivities of the 
PDF of the CSRV with respect to the parameters ( ) /f s  are zero in this problem. All the 
sensitivity calculations are performed for the case 000,1L  kN for which the failure 
probability is .1012.2 2  One can either compute the sensitivity of a system event in Eq. (4.5) 
directly or sum up the sensitivities computed for seven subsystems in Eq. (4.6). Table 4.3 lists 
the sensitivities of the system failure probabilities sysP  and the corresponding generalized 
reliability indices )(1 syssys P
  with respect to the means of the member capacities ,i  
.6,...,1i  It is obvious that the signs of isysP  /  and isys  /  are negative and positive 
respectively since the increase in a member capacity should enhance the system reliability. 
According to the absolute values of the computed sensitivities, the importance ranking of 
members is in the order (6)→(5)→(1)→(2),(3),(4). Table 4.4 lists the sensitivities with respect to 
the standard deviations ,i  .6,...,1i  The signs of the sensitivities are opposite to those of the 
sensitivities with respect to the means because the variability in the member capacities will 
increase the likelihood of the failure. The importance ranking is (6)→(1)→(5)→(2),(3),(4). Note 
that the relative importance rankings identified by the sensitivities with respect to means and 
standard deviations are not identical necessarily. Figure 4.9 plots the computed sensitivities of 
reliability index for visual comparison. 
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Table 4.3 Sensitivities of system failure probability and generalized reliability index with 
respect to means of member capacities 
 
Member 
i  
/sys iP   /sys i   
j  ( ij  ) 
fixed 
 i  
6,...,1i  j
  ( ij  ) 
fixed 
 i  
6,...,1i  
1 51049.2   
41001.3   
41090.4   
31094.5   
2 61087.7   41055.1   
3 61087.7   41055.1   
4 61087.7   41055.1   
5 51048.4   41083.8   
6 41008.2   31010.4   
 
 
Table 4.4 Sensitivities of system failure probability and generalized reliability index with 
respect to standard deviations of member capacities 
 
Member 
i  
/sys iP   /sys i   
j  ( ij  ) 
fixed 
 i  
6,...,1i  j
  ( ij  ) 
fixed 
 i  
6,...,1i  
1 51006.7   
41069.5   
31039.1   
21012.1   
2 51060.1   41016.3   
3 51060.1   41016.3   
4 51060.1   41016.3   
5 51029.4   41046.8   
6 41008.4   31003.8   
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Figure 4.9 Sensitivities of generalized reliability index with respect to means and standard 
deviations of member capacities. 
 
Suppose upgrades are made for all six members concurrently rather than individually, and for a 
given budget, one can either (a) increase the means by a design change or (b) decrease the 
standard deviations by quality control. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the sensitivities of the failure 
probability and reliability index with respect to the concurrent changes in the means (  i ) 
and the standard deviations (  i ), respectively. These are computed by the sum of the 
individual sensitivities. The absolute values of the sensitivities with respect to the standard 
deviation ( 41069.5   and 21012.1  ) are larger than those with respect to the means 
( 41001.3   and 31094.5  ). However, this does not necessarily imply that the upgrade by 
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uncertainty management is more efficient because the changes we can make in the means and 
standard deviations may be different for a given limited budget. The upgrade worth measures in 
Eq. (3.22) (Der Kiureghian et al. 2007) are estimated to quantify the merits of possible upgrade 
options given a budget. Figure 4.10 plots the ratio of the upgrade worth measures of two options, 
i.e.  II /  as a function of the ratio of the changes in the mean and standard deviations 
achieved by a given budget, i.e., .|/|   If the ratio of the upgrade worth measures is 
greater than 1 for a given |,/|   the upgrade by enhancing the mean capacities is 
considered better strategy. The critical value of |/|   which makes the ratio 1.0 is 
4
4
cr
/ 5.69 10 1.89
/ 3.01 10
sys
sys
P
P


         (4.7) 
For a given budget, one can compare |/|   with this critical value to select the better 
upgrade option. 
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Figure 4.10  Ratio of upgrade worth measures versus ratio of fixed cost increments. 
 
4.3. Connectivity of Bridge Network  
As an application of the MSR method to lifeline network reliability analysis, a transportation 
network that connects eight cities by highways with twelve bridges is considered. Figure 4.11 
shows the cities and the bridges in the network by circles and squares, respectively, along with 
their identification numbers. For simplicity, it is assumed that there are no other routes between 
cities than the highways shown in Figure 4.11. It is also assumed that the bridges are the only 
components of the highway system whose seismic damages may cause paths to be disconnected. 
 II /  
 /  
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Suppose City 1 has a major hospital that should be accessible from the other cities in case of 
emergency. The concurrent failures of some bridges may isolate a city from the hospital for a 
prolonged period after an earthquake event. For decision-makings on the retrofits of bridges or 
general mitigation strategies, it is essential to estimate the probability of such disconnection 
events based on the fragility estimates of bridge structures and a seismic hazard model. However, 
the events of disconnections are so complex that it is difficult to identify all the cut sets or link 
sets, and to compute the probability of disconnections analytically. This example demonstrates 
the merits of the proposed MSR method in identifying/handling various complex system events 
and estimating the probabilities thereof. 
 
 
Figure 4.11  Example bridge network 
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For the bridge failure probabilities given a seismic intensity, we make use of predictive fragility 
estimates based on multi-variate probabilistic capacity and demand models developed by a 
Bayesian framework (Gardoni et al. 2002, 2003). These models properly account for both 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, and correct the conservatism inherent in the deterministic 
models. Two bridge configurations, single-bent (Figure 4.12) and two-bent overpasses (Figure 
4.13) are considered. In the example network, Bridges 4 and 10 have two-bent overpasses while 
the other bridges have one-bents. The bridge examples are designed by Mackie and Stojadinović 
(2001) according to Caltrans’ Bridge Design Specification and Seismic Design Criteria (Caltrans 
1999). Details on the design parameters for the overpass bridges are defined in Gardoni et al. 
(2003). In particular, the means of the natural periods of the single-bent and the two-bent 
overpasses are 0.8 sec. and 1.01 sec., respectively. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 also show the 
corresponding fragility estimates for given spectral accelerations, aS , where the fragility is 
defined as the conditional probability of attaining or exceeding specified shear and deformation 
performance levels for a given value of aS . It is noted that the shear and deformation fragilities 
used in the chapter are the conditional probabilities of failure of a bridge. In this case, a bridge 
subject to an earthquake is in either of the following two damage states: failure and not 
failure. However, other fragilities that correspond to intermediate performance levels (e.g., 
immediate service level, and repairable damage) could also be used. In this case a bridge subject 
to an earthquake can be in multiple damage states, for example, no or insignificant damage, 
moderate damage, heavy damage, and complete failure. Each performance level can be used to 
delimit two damage states and the fragilities can be used to compute the probability of being in 
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each damage state. The probabilities of being in each damage state can then be used with the 
proposed MSR method to assess the probability of being in a network-level damage state that 
can be expressed, for example, in terms of number of lanes open between network nodes instead 
of simply connectivity. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Example single-bent overpass bridge (not to scale) (left) and corresponding 
fragility function (right) (Gardoni et al., 2003) 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Example two-bent overpass bridge (not to scale) (left) and corresponding fragility 
function (right) (Gardoni et al., 2003)  
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Earthquakes that may occur at a point of seismogenic rupture on the nearby fault are considered 
as shown in Figure 4.11. The earthquake magnitude M  is assumed to follow the truncated 
exponential distribution (Cosentino et al. 1977) whose PDF )(mfM  is given as 
 
0
0
0
exp[ ( )]     for 
1 exp[ ( )]( )
0                                     elsewhere
p
pM
m m m m m
m mf m
        
 (4.8) 
where   is a parameter that determines the shape of the distribution; and 0m  and pm  are 
minimum and maximum thresholds of the considered magnitudes. In this example, we use 
,76.0  0.60 m  and .5.8pm  
 The spectral accelerations aS  at the bridge sites are estimated in two steps. First we 
propagate the horizontal component of the peak ground acceleration ,HA  from the epicenter of 
the earthquake to the location of the bridge. Then we convert HA  into the corresponding aS  
based on the natural period of the bridge. The following attenuation relationship developed by 
Campbell (1997) is used for propagating :HA  
2 2ln( ) 3.512 0.904 1.328ln{ [0.149exp(0.647 )] }
    [1.125 0.112ln 0.0957 ] [0.440 0.171ln ] [0.405 0.222ln ]
H
SR HR
A M r M
r M F r S r S
     
      (4.9) 
where F  represents the fault type, here assumed to be 0  for strike-slip type faulting; SRS  
and HRS  define the local site conditions, here assumed to be alluvium or firm soil 
);0(  HRSR SS  and r  is the distance between the site of interest (bridge) and the epicenter. 
The distances of Bridges 1–12 in the network are 12.0, 9.4, 7.5, 10.1, 14.6, 19.2, 18.0, 8.3, 23.9, 
49 
 
13.0, 3.3, 9.6 kilometers, respectively. The value of aS  for each bridge is obtained by 
multiplying HA  at each bridge site by 1.1 for the single-bent over pass, and by 0.75 for the two-
bent overpass considering their expected natural periods. These multiplication factors are 
obtained from the response spectrum in Chopra (1995). 
4.3.1. Disconnection between Cities and Hospital 
We first estimate the probability that each city is disconnected from the hospital by using the 
MSR method. If a path has at least one failed bridge, the path is not available. When all the paths 
connecting a city and the hospital are unavailable, the city is disconnected from the hospital. 
Therefore, the disconnection event is represented by a link set system event. Taking advantage of 
the matrix-based framework, we identify a single system event vector directly from matrix 
manipulations instead of identifying and handling numerous link sets. 
 For example, consider the event that City 5 is disconnected from City 1. There are six 
distinct paths between the cities: {5→1}, {5→2→1}, {5→7→1}, {5→2→6→1}, 
{5→2→6→3→1} and {5→2→6→3→8→4→1}. We first construct an event vector representing 
the failure of bridges ,iEc  .12,,2,1 i  From these component event vectors, the event vector 
of the disconnection of each path is obtained by Eq. (3.3). For example, the path {5→2→1} 
involves Bridges 2 and 3, and therefore its event vector is 
32{5 2 1} ( ).*( )EE     c 1 1 c 1 c  (4.10) 
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Then, we construct the event vector of the disconnection from the event vectors of all the paths 
using Eq. (3.3): 
{5 1} {5 2 1} {5 7 1} {5 2 6 1} {5 2 6 3 1}
{5 2 6 3 8 4 1}
.* .* .* .* .*
      
           
     
c c c c c c
c
 (4.11) 
All of these processes are performed by a matrix-based computer code.  
In this example, we assume the only source of statistical dependence between the 
failures of bridges is the uncertain earthquake magnitude .M  While there may exist 
dependencies due to commonalities in the experienced deteriorating conditions, maintenance, 
etc., conditional independence of bridge failures given a seismic intensity is usually a reasonable 
approximation. However, it is noted that the MSR method can account for the statistical 
dependence between the component events in general even in the case where the statistical 
dependence is not explicitly identified (Song and Kang 2009). For a given magnitude ,mM   
we estimate the spectral acceleration aS  at each bridge site and find the corresponding failure 
probability from the fragility function (Figures 4.12 or 4.13). Taking advantage of the conditional 
independence, we construct the conditional probability vector for a given earthquake magnitude 
,mM   denoted by ),(mp  using the matrix-based procedure in Eq. (3.4) and the bridge 
fragilities. Then, the conditional probability of the disconnection event given an earthquake 
magnitude is computed by 
)()|( T mmMEP sys pc   (4.12) 
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Note that the event vector is not affected by the magnitude and hence obtained only once. Figure 
4.14 shows )|( mMEP sys   for the eight cities considered. A decision-maker may be interested 
in the probability that at least one city is disconnected from the hospital. This event is the union 
of the disconnection events of the cities. Therefore, the event vector for this new system event is 
easily obtained by Eq. (3.3) (the one for the union) with the event vectors already identified for 
the cities. 
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Figure 4.14 Conditional probability of disconnection between each city and hospital for given 
earthquake magnitude 
 
52 
 
Using Eq. (3.14), we compute the probabilities of disconnections for an earthquake with 
uncertain magnitude. Figure 4.15 shows the computed probabilities along with the probability of 
at least one disconnection. These disconnection probabilities are influenced by three important 
factors: distances between the bridges and the epicenter, the network configuration, and the 
fragilities of the bridges. This example demonstrates that the system reliability analysis by the 
MSR method systematically accounts for all these factors in estimating the likelihood of various 
events. First, it is seen that Cities 4, 7 and 8 have the highest probabilities of disconnection. 
These cities have only two outgoing paths while the other cities have three. This network 
configuration makes the three cities have lower probabilities of exit and thus increases the 
probabilities of disconnection. It is also noteworthy that, among these three cities, City 7 shows 
the highest failure probability. This is because the paths coming out of City 7 are closer to the 
seismic source than those of the other two cities. Because of the seismic attenuation, the bridges 
on the closer paths are subjected to stronger ground motions. Finally, the actual fragility of a 
bridge is important in determining the disconnection probability since the latter is a direct 
function of the bridge fragilities. Increasing the overall safety of the bridges in a network 
increases the network safety, reducing the disconnection probability. Conversely, the 
deterioration of the bridges in a network over time leads to more vulnerable bridges and thus to a 
more vulnerable network. The network topology and the distance of each bridge to the epicenter 
define how each bridge fragility affects the network fragility. 
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Figure 4.15  Probability of disconnection between each city and hospital 
 
4.3.2. Disconnection between County and Hospital 
Consider Counties 1, 2 and 3 that are constituted by Cities (2,5,7), (3,6) and (4, 8), respectively. 
Suppose the officials of a county want to know the probability that their county will be 
disconnected from the hospital. An important merit of MSR method is that we can construct the 
event vector of a new system event easily from other component/system events. Moreover, since 
there is no change in component probabilities, we do not need to construct the probability vector 
again. In this example, the event of a county’s disconnection is the intersection of the events of 
the disconnections of all the constituent cities. Therefore, the event vector of a county’s 
disconnection is conveniently obtained by Eq. (3.3). For example, the event vector for County 1 
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is obtained as .*.*. 7521 CityCityCityCounty cccc   Using the conditional probability vector )(mp  in 
the previous example and the new event vectors, the conditional probabilities of county 
disconnections are calculated (Figure 4.16). The probability of a county’s disconnection for an 
earthquake with uncertain intensity is easily estimated by use of the county’s event vector and 
the predictive probability vector ,~p  which was estimated in the previous example. The 
disconnection probabilities of Counties 1–3 are 5.9810–6, 1.0910–5 and 2.6410–4, respectively. 
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Figure 4.16  Conditional probability of disconnection between each county and hospital for 
given earthquake magnitude 
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4.3.3. Number of Failed Bridges 
The event that a certain number of bridges will fail is also a complex system event. In the case 
when the components have the same probabilities and they are statistically independent, one can 
compute the probability of such event using the Binomial distribution. MSR can compute such 
probabilities conveniently even in the case of non-homogeneous component probabilities and/or 
dependent components. For example, the event that exactly one bridge will fail is defined as 
12113211232112321fails bridge one  EEEEEEEEEEEEEE   (4.13) 
The corresponding event vector is obtained by matrix manipulations in Eq. (3.3).  Since the 
conditional and predictive probability vectors in the previous examples are reused, there is no 
additional cost for the computation. Figure 4.17 shows the probabilities that the number of failed 
bridges is at least .4,,1k  
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Figure 4.17  Probability that at least k (k =1,…,4) bridges fail for given earthquake magnitude 
 
4.3.4. Disconnection between City 5 and Hospital in Case of No Information on Bridge 12 
Suppose we try to estimate the probability of disconnection between City 5 and hospital but the 
fragility of Bridge 12 is not available due to insufficient information or data. The MSR 
framework still allows us to obtain the narrowest bounds on the system probability by use of the 
LP bounds method in Eq. (3.9). For the vector c  in the LP problem, we use the event vector 
previously identified for City 5. Instead of constructing the vector p  completely, we use it as 
unknown decision variable for the LP. We compute the elements of the vector for which we have 
information and use them as equality constraints in Eq. (3.9). If bounds on the probabilities are 
available, we use them as inequality constraints in Eq. (3.9). The axioms of probability should 
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be added as constraints as well (Song and Der Kiureghian 2003a). By solving the LP, we find the 
two p  vectors that minimize or maximize the system probability .Tpc  Figure 4.18 compares 
the LP bounds with the probabilities evaluated based on the complete information. Note that we 
can still estimate narrow bounds on the system probabilities in spite of the incomplete 
information on a bridge without introducing an arbitrary assumption. 
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Figure 4.18 Conditional probability of disconnection between City 5 and hospital for given 
earthquake magnitude 
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4.3.5. Importance Measures of Bridges 
Suppose we intend to improve the post-hazard connectivity of the whole region by retrofitting 
selected bridges in the network. With limited budget, we may want to identify the bridges whose 
upgrade would enhance the connectivity in the most efficient manner. Here we define the 
important bridges in terms of the likelihood that there is at least one disconnected city in the 
region. Using the MSR method, we compute the importance measure CIM  in Eq. (3.10) of 
each bridge for a given earthquake magnitude. By total probability theorem, we can evaluate 
CIM  for an uncertain magnitude as well. Figure 4.19 shows the CIM ’s of the twelve bridges. 
Since CIM’s quantify the contributions of the likelihood of the individual bridge failures to that 
of the system failure event of interest, retrofits or upgrades on the bridges with high CIM’s are 
expected to reduce the system failure probability in the most efficiently manner. Bridges 1 and 5 
are identified as the most important ones. It is noteworthy that these are on the paths connecting 
City 7, the most vulnerable city according to the results in Figure 4.15. The MSR method allows 
us to compute the various importance measures based on different definitions of importance 
without additional cost in computation. 
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Figure 4.19  CIM of bridges with respect to disconnection of at least one city 
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Chapter 5   Further Development of MSR Method 
Although the merits of the MSR method have been demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
following limitations of the method was identified: (1) If direct numerical integration is used in 
the CSRV space, the method becomes inefficient as the number of CSRVs are increased for more 
accurate evaluation; and (2) Matrix-based procedures for obtaining parameter sensitivities of 
system failure probability are needed also for parameters that affect the correlation coefficients 
between the components. In this chapter, the MSR method is further developed to overcome 
these limitations. 
5.1. Multinormal Integrals and Sensitivities by MSR Method 
In this section, the matrix based formulations introduced in Chapter 3 are reformulated for 
evaluating multinormal integrals and their parameter sensitivities. Using the formulation in Eqs. 
(3.12) and (3.13) and the CSRVs identified by use of the generalized DS class model in Eq. 
(3.16), the multinormal integral in Eq. (2.1) can be computed as 
T( ) ( ) ( ; )sys mP E d 
s
c p s s I s  (5.1) 
where c  is the event vector that describes the system event in  , obtained by the matrix-based 
procedures in Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3); and m  is the number of the identified CSRVs. 
)();( 1 i
m
im s Is  is the joint PDF of m uncorrelated standard normal random variables, in 
which )(  denotes the marginal PDF of the standard normal distribution. The conditional 
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probability vector )(sp , given sS  , is constructed by the matrix-based procedure in Eq. (3.4)
with ,iP ni ,...,1  replaced by the conditional component probability, given ,sS   i.e. 
 1
2
1
( )( ) ( | )
1
m
i k ik k
i i i m
k ik
r sP P Z
r
 

           
s s  (5.2) 
where )(  is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. 
The sizes of c  and ( )p s  increases exponentially with the number of components. When the 
size of vectors exceeds the available computer memory, the matrix formulation in Eq. (5.1) can 
be transformed to a scalar-based formulation. For example, the multinormal integrals for series 
and parallel systems can be computed by 
 1
1
( ) 1 { [1 ( )]} ( ; )
n
n
sys i i i m
i
P E P E P d

         s s s I s  (5.3) 
1
1
( ) [ ( )] ( ; )
n
n
sys i i i m
i
P E P E P d

       s s s I s  (5.4) 
This type of alternative scalar-based formulation can also be derived for a given general system 
event. This scalar-based formulation helps overcome the size issue, but does not have the 
uniform applicability to general systems.  
The parameter sensitivity of a multinormal integral can be computed by use of the 
formulation in Eqs. (3.23) and (3.26), i.e. 
T T( ) ( ) ( ; ) ( )( ; ) ( ) ( ; )sys mm m
P E
d d
              s s
p s s I p sc s I p s s c s I s  (5.5) 
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in which the second term in the brackets is zero because ( ; )m s I  is not affected by a design 
parameter   in general. The vector ( ) / p s  is constructed by the matrix-based procedure in 
Eq. (3.24) using the component parameter sensitivities, i.e. 
1
( ) ( ) ( )mi i i i ik
ki ik
P P P r
r
           s s s  (5.6) 
in which /i   can be obtained by the component analysis method such as FORM (Bjerager 
and Krenk 1989); and ( ) /i iP s  and ( ) /i ikP r s  are derived from Eq. (5.2) as 
1
2 2
1 1
( ) ( ) 1
1 1
m
i i k ik k
m m
i k ik k ik
P r s
r r

 
                      
s  (5.7) 
and 
 1 1 3/22 2 21 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
m m
i i k ik k k i k ik k
ikm m m
ik k ik k ik k ik
P r s s r s r
r r r r
 
  
                           
s  (5.8) 
Finally, the sensitivity of DS model parameter with respect to  , i.e. / ikr  is zero if the 
parameter   has no effect on correlations between the components. If   affects the correlation 
coefficients, it can be obtained numerically by a finite difference method or by use of a method 
developed in Section 5.3.  
5.2. Efficient Numerical Integration by FORM/SORM 
Direct numerical integration of Eqs. (3.12), (3.13), (3.23), (3.26), (5.1) and (5.5) may be 
time-consuming and/or cause numerical issues if a large number of CSRVs are used for accurate 
DS fitting. Using the fast probability integration technique (Wen and Chen 1987), originally 
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developed for time-variant reliability analyses, one can perform the integrations efficiently using 
FORM or SORM. For example, the integral in Eq. (5.1) can be represented in the space of 
)1( m statistically independent standard normal random variables T1T ]   [  msss  as 
1
1
( ) 0
( ) [ ( )]msys i i
G
P E s d
 
  
s
s  (5.9) 
in which 
1 T
1( ) [ ( )]mG s

  s c p s   (5.10) 
This component reliability problem can be solved efficiently by FORM or SORM (see Der 
Kiureghian (2005) for a comprehensive review on FORM and SORM). In order to facilitate the 
constrained nonlinear optimization required for finding the “design point” or the “most probable 
failure point,” the derivatives of the limit state function in Eq. (5.10) with respect to the random 
variables are derived as 
 
T
1
( ) 1 for 1,...,( ) ( ( '))
1 for 1
i m
i
i mG s s G
s
i m

          
p scs s  (5.11) 
It is noted that the limit-state function ( )G s  and the gradients ( ) / iG s s  require the 
computation of the probability vector and its sensitivities, which can be done efficiently by use 
of the matrix-based procedures shown in Section 5.3. 
 In order to test this approach, we consider a parallel system with ten component events, 
i.e. i iZ   , 1,...,10i  , whose reliability indices are defined as (4 22) / 9i i    . All the 
correlation coefficients between the standard normal random variables are given as 0.5 except 
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that the two pairs (1,5) and (2,4) which have correlation coefficients equal to 0.4, and the three 
pairs (1,7), (2,6) and (3,5) with 0.9. This correlation coefficient matrix requires many CSRVs for 
accurate DS-class fitting, which would make the direct numerical integration of Eq. (5.1) 
inefficient or inaccurate. The “exact” estimate of the system probability by MCS (108 samplings) 
is 4.480×10–3. 
 Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 compare the results by MCS with those by MSR method using 
various integration options. “MSR/FORM” and “MSR/SORM” are the results based on the 
approach proposed in this section. For SORM analysis, a point-fitting SORM method (Der 
Kiureghian et al. 1987) is used in conjunction with Tvedt’s exact formula (Tvedt 1983). 
FORM/SORM analyses are performed using a Matlab-based computer code for structural 
reliability analysis FERUM (Der Kiureghian et al. 2006). “MSR/direct” and “MSR/MCS” are 
the results by direct numerical integration and MCS estimation (106 samples each) of Eq. (5.1), 
respectively. First, all the options show unreliable estimates when less than 5 CSRVs are used, 
due to the significant DS fitting errors. As the DS fitting error becomes insignificant due to a 
larger number of CSRVs, MSR/SORM yields accurate results while MSR/FORM overestimates 
the failure probability consistently. However, MSR/FORM still provides more accurate estimates 
than the PCM method (Pandey 1998), which gives 2.37×10–3. It is noted that the proposed 
approach needs much fewer number of evaluations of ( )p s  than direct numerical integration, 
which requires evaluation of ( )p s  at each discretized point in the CSRV space. For example, 
when four CSRVs are used, ( )p s  is evaluated only 131 times for MSR/FORM and 44 additional 
evaluations for MSR/SORM. The sensitivity vectors ( ) / is p s , 1,..., 4i   in Eq. (5.11) are 
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evaluated 30×4=120 times. By contrast, the total number of the evaluations of ( )p s  during the 
direct integration is 108, when 100 discretized points are selected for each dimension. This would 
increase exponentially as the number of CSRVs increases. The proposed approach needs to be 
thoroughly tested by various examples for further development. Some other methods for efficient 
integration in the CSRV space, for example by use of the importance sampling technique, can be 
developed as well. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1  Error in DS fitting and multinormal probabilities by MSR method 
No. of 
CSRVs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DS fitting 
error (%) 
45.3 40.7 20.1 4.98 3.93 3.42×10–4 2.51×10–4 2.67×10–4 3.04×10–4 2.26×10–4 
MSR/FORM 4.15×10–3 4.56×10–3 4.00×10–3 5.00×10–3 5.44×10–3 5.45×10–3 5.51×10–3 5.47×10–3 5.89×10–3 5.47×10–3 
MSR/SORM 3.92×10–3 4.25×10–3 3.56×10–3 4.16×10–3 4.46×10–3 4.22×10–3 4.29×10–3 4.37×10–3 4.38×10–3 4.49×10–3 
MSR/direct 3.92×10–3 4.25×10–3 3.58×10–3 4.19×10–3  
MSR/MCS 4.00×10–3 4.77×10–3 3.52×10–3 4.20×10–3 4.63×10–3 4.54×10–3 4.32×10–3 4.43×10–3 4.56×10–3 4.53×10–3 
MCS 4.48×10–3 (108 samples) 
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Figure 5.1 Comparison between MCS and MSR results by various integration options 
 
5.3. System Sensitivity with Respect to Design Parameter that Affects Correlation 
Coefficients 
When computing the parameter sensitivity in Eq. (5.6), the term /ikr   is needed if the 
parameter   affects the correlation coefficients. However, this term is usually not available 
analytically because ikr ’s are obtained by the optimization process in Eq. (3.18). An efficient 
approach to estimate /ikr   is proposed herein. From the generalized DS class correlation in 
Eq. (3.17), the derivatives of correlation coefficients are derived as 
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1
( )
m
ij jkik
jk ik
k
rr r r

        for 1,..., 1i n  , and 1,...,j i n   (5.12) 
This can be described using a matrix form, i.e. 
 r ρ A r  (5.13) 
where ρ  is the vector containing /ij   for i j , 1,..., 1i n  , and 1j i  ,…, n ; rA is 
the matrix of ikr  and jkr  that describes the relationship in Eq. (5.12); and r  is the vector of 
/ikr   for 1,...,i n , and 1,...,k m . For example, if a four-component system is described 
by one CSRV, the corresponding matrix formulation is  
 
12 2 1
13 3 1 1
14 4 1 2
23 3 2 3
24 4 2 4
34 3 4
/ 0 0
/ 0 0 /
/ 0 0 /
/ 0 0 /
/ 0 0 /
/ 0 0
r r
r r r
r r r
r r r
r r r
r r
                                                 
 (5.14) 
From Eq. (5.13), a least-square estimate of r  is obtained as 
T 1 Tˆ ( )r r r

 r A A A ρ . 
While the DS model coefficients in rA  are available from DS fitting, the sensitivities of the 
correlation coefficients /ij   in ρ  need to be evaluated in order to perform the least-
square estimation. A finite difference method can be used or the sensitivities of correlation 
coefficients can be derived for each case. In this chapter, for example, we consider systems 
consisting of component events described by linear (or linearized) limit state functions of normal 
random variables, and derive the sensitivities of correlation coefficients with respect to the 
68 
 
standard deviations of the random variables. Let us consider a component failure event described 
by a linear limit state function, i.e. 
 T 0( ) 0g a  x a x  (5.15) 
where a  is a vector of constants; 0a  is a constant; and x  is a vector of normal random 
variables with mean vector XM  and covariance matrix XXΣ . Through a linear transformation 
(see Der Kiureghian 2005), the limit-state function in Eq. (5.15) and its gradient vector can be 
described in terms of uncorrelated standard normal random vector u  as follows: 
T T
0( ) ( )G g a    X Xu DLu M a DLu a M  (5.16) 
T( )G u u a DL   (5.17) 
where D  is the diagonal matrix of the standard deviations; and L is the lower triangular matrix 
obtained by the Cholesky decomposition of the correlation matrix. The normalized gradient 
vector of the limit state function pointing towards the failure domain is  
T
T
( )ˆ
( )
G
G
   
u
u
u a DLα
u a DL
 (5.18) 
Note that all the gradient vectors are given as row vectors in this thesis. If the component events 
in Eq. (5.15) are described by correlated standard normal random variables and their reliability 
indexes, i.e. i iZ   , 1,...,i n , the correlation coefficient between iZ  and jZ  is determined 
by the inner product of the corresponding gradient vectors, i.e. 
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Tˆ ˆij i j  α α   (5.19) 
where ˆ iα  and ˆ jα  denote the negative normalized gradient vectors of the i-th and j-th 
components, respectively, obtained by Eq. (5.18) using the coefficients corresponding to the 
limit-state functions. From Eq. (5.19), the sensitivity of the correlation coefficient with respect 
to the standard deviation of the k-th random variable is 
T
T ˆˆ ˆ ˆij ji j i
k k k
    
αα α α  for 1,..., 1i n  , and 1,...,j i n   (5.20) 
where /i k   is derived as follows: 
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  (5.21) 
where G  is the simplified notation of ( )Gu u  in Eq. (5.17); h  is an infinitesimal change 
in k ; and G  denotes the corresponding change in G , which is described as 
T
kG h  a I L  in which kI  denotes the matrix with the same dimension as D  that has zero 
for each element except the one at the k-th diagonal element. The method and derivations 
presented in this section will be demonstrated by an application example in the following section. 
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5.4. Applications to Structural Systems 
5.4.1. Daniels System Structure 
The so-called Daniels system (Daniels 1945), i.e. a bundle of ideally brittle wires or bars, is often 
used as a numerical example in developing and testing new system reliability analysis methods 
(Song and Der Kiureghian 2003, Straub and Der Kiureghian 2007). This system fails only when 
all the components, i.e. wires fail. This is a complex system event because of the load 
redistributions caused by member failures. In this section, an assembly of three Daniels systems 
shown in Figure 5.1 is considered. This example is created by modifying the two-story Daniels 
system example by Gharaibeh et al. (2002). The system failure is defined as an event in which 
one of the three stories completely fails due to a tensile load. 
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Figure 5.2 A three-story Daniels system 
 
The structure consists of six bars that are assumed to be perfectly brittle and linear elastic. The 
cross sectional areas are given as 1A = 0.06 m
2, 2 3A A  0.03 m2, 4 5 6A A A   0.02 m2 so 
that the sum of the member areas in each story is identical. The yield capacities of the six 
members and the external tensional force are assumed to be random. Table 5.2 summarizes the 
means, coefficients of variation (c.o.v.) and the distribution types of the random variables. All the 
1
2 3
4 5 6
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random variables are assumed to be statistically independent except that the capacities of the 
members in the same story have correlation coefficients equal to 0.6, i.e., 23 0.6  , and 
45 46 56 0.6       in which ij  denotes the correlation between the capacities of the i-th and 
j-th bars. For simplicity, this example considers limit-states on yielding failures only.  
 
Table 5.2  Statistical properties of random variables in Daniels system 
 
 Mean c.o.v. Distribution type 
Yield strengths 
(six random 
variables) 
280 MPa 0.1 
Lognormal 
Tensile load 
(one random 
variable) 
12,000 kN 0.1 
 
The system is a statically indeterminate structure having numerous possible failure paths. Since it 
is computationally inefficient to deal with all the possible paths in system reliability analysis, the 
nine most likely failure paths in Figure 5.3 are used to compute the probability of the system 
failure. Each failure path consists of 1 to 3 member failure events, which are described as 
follows:  
( ) ( ),( ) ( ) ( ) 0k i k i ii yg     x x x  (5.22) 
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where ( )k i  is the index of the member that fails in the i-th failure event; ( )k iy  denotes the 
yield strength of the member ( )k i ; and ( ), ( )k i i x  is the stress of the k(i)-th member in the 
system configuration for which the i-th failure event occurs. The numbering choice of the 
members and failure events are presented in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Note that the stress ( ), ( )k i i x  
depends on the load redistributions caused by member failures. The probabilities of the 20 
component failure events are computed by FORM, therefore, the component events are described 
by use of correlated standard normal random variables, i.e. i iZ   , 1,..., 20i  , in which i  
is the reliability index obtained by FORM analysis. The correlation coefficients between iZ ’s 
are computed by the inner product of the normalized gradient vectors as in Eq. (5.19). 
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Figure 5.3 Critical failure paths toward system failure 
 
The system failure event is described as a cut-set system consisting of 20 component failure 
events, i.e. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 9 10 11 12 13 11 14 15
16 17 18 16 19 20          
sysE E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
E E E E E E
       
  (5.23) 
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Using the event vector that describes the event in Eq. (5.23) and conditional probability vector 
( )p s , one can compute ( )sysP E  by the MSR method. 
First, the MSR method is used with direct numerical integration in the CSRV space. The 
system failure probabilities are listed in Table 5.3 along with the number of CSRVs and 
corresponding DS fitting error (in percentage). Considering the DS fitting errors and the 
guidelines from the parametric study (Kang et al. 2010), it is seen that three CSRVs are not 
enough for accurate system reliability analysis. In fact, at least five CSRVs should be used for 
reasonable DS fitting, which results in negligible fitting error. Because the direct numerical 
integration in the five-dimensional CSRV space is inefficient, the MSR/SORM approach 
(presented in Section 5.2) is utilized. Comparison with the results by MCS demonstrates the 
accuracy of the approach. 
 
Table 5.3  System failure probability of Daniels system 
 
 MSR/Direct Numerical Integration MSR/SORM 
MCS 
(108 
samples) 
No. of CSRVs 1 2 3 5 — 
DS fitting 
error (%) 
165.5 61.98 64.82 1.433×10–5 — 
Probability 
4.135×10–
2 
3.912×10–
2 
3.834×10–
2 
3.516×10–2 3.552×10–2 
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5.4.2. Finite Element System Reliability Analysis of a Bridge Pylon Structure 
In this application example, the system reliability of a bridge pylon structure (see Figure 5.4) and 
its parameter sensitivities are evaluated by utilizing the further developments of the MSR method, 
presented herein, in conjunction with a finite element (FE) analysis. Young Joo Lee developed 
this structural model and provided a support for the FE reliability analysis. The dimensions of the 
pylon structure are chosen based on an actual bridge design. The 70-meter-long pylon has two 
symmetric arms, each of which consists of a main body with trapezoidal cross-section, 13 
stiffeners, and 23 diaphragms. The dimensions of the left arm are shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.4 Pylon structure of cable stayed bridge 
 
 
Figure 5.5 FE model of the left arm of the Pylon 
Z
X
  RP−1
2.2m 2.8m 
2.0m 
70.0m 
Diaphragms : 2 + 3@22 + 2m 
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Real bridge structures are usually exposed to various kinds of loads. These loads are often 
combined into load cases based on possible loading scenarios. This example considers the 
following load combinations made of four types of design loads, i.e. dead load (D), live load (L), 
wind load in service (WL) and wind load out of service (W), which are widely used in bridge 
design communities: 
Load Combination 1 (LC1): D + L + WL
Load Combination 2 (LC2): D + W
 (5.24) 
The dead load (D) includes the self-weight and the pre-stress force of the cables. The live load 
(L) includes the loads caused by the traffic and the pedestrians. The in-service wind load (WL) 
represents the wind loads when the bridge is in service. The out-of-service wind load (W) models 
the wind loads when vehicles are prohibited to pass over the bridge due to the strong winds. In 
this example, the pylon structure is modeled independently from the entire bridge system by 
giving proper boundary conditions: the bottom end of the pylon is assumed to be fixed, and a 
reasonable axial force, shear force, and moment are specified at the top end to describe the 
reactions to cable anchors. Figure 5.5 shows the free body diagrams of the pylon structure and 
boundary conditions for the four types of loads that are considered. 
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(i) Dead load (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Live load (L) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) In-service wind load 
(WL: In-plane & Out-of-plane)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iv) Out-of-service wind load  
(W: In-plane & Out-of-plane) 
 
Pylon  
self-weight 
: 77KN/m3 
9,000KN·m 
200KN 
2,000KN 
100KN·m 
 
2 ,000KN 
800KN·m 
40KN 
900KN 
400KN·m 
20KN 
1200KN·m 
60KN 
1,200KN 
600KN·m 
30KN 3.3KN/m
2 
3.3KN/m2 
4.4KN/m2 
4.4KN/m2 
Figure 5.6 Loads considered during component and system reliability analysis 
 
In this example, a total of 19 random variables are considered: 6 for Young’s moduli, 6 for yield 
strengths, and 7 for the load scale factors. Table 5.4 lists the means, c.o.v.’s, and the distribution 
types for these variables. Each of the two symmetric pylon arms is composed of one main body, 
13 stiffeners, and 23 diaphragms. Based on findings from preliminary FE reliability analyses, a 
single random variable is assigned to represent the uncertainty of Young’s modulus or yield 
80 
 
strength for the whole set of diaphragms or stiffeners in each arm. This leads to 12 random 
variables representing Young’s moduli and yield strengths of two main bodies, two groups of 
diaphragms, and two groups of stiffeners. To describe uncertainty in the load intensities, random 
load scale factors are introduced. Two random scale factors for dead load (self-weight and pre-
stress), one for live load, and four for wind loads (in-plane and out-of-plane directions for W and 
WL load cases) are assigned. Figure 5.5 shows these load components that appear in the four 
types of loads that are considered. In this study, all the random variables are assumed to be 
statistically independent except for the following cases: First, it is assumed that all parts (i.e., 
bodies, stiffeners, and diaphragms) are made of the same steel from the same manufacturer, and 
thus they are highly correlated. So, the correlation coefficient between Young’s moduli of 
different parts is assumed to be 0.9. The same assumption is made for yield strengths of different 
parts. For the four load scale factors related to wind loads, i.e. W (in-plane), W (out-of-plane), 
WL (in-plane) and WL (out-of-plane), the correlation coefficients for the pairs of loads are 
assumed as follows. 
{W (in-plane), W (out-of-plane)} and {WL (in-plane), WL (out-of-plane)} : 0.8 
{W (in-plane), WL (in-plane)} and {W (out-of-plane), WL (out-of-plane)}: 0.6 
{W (in-plane), WL (out-of-plane)} and {W (out-of-plane), WL (in-plane)}: 0.48 
It is assumed that the material used in the pylon structure shows linear elastic behavior until it 
reaches the yielding stress limit. For simplicity, this example considers the yielding failures only. 
A component failure event, which can be defined for each combination of a selected physical 
component and a load case, is described as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0yg     x x x  (5.25) 
where ( )y x  denotes the yield strength of the physical component such as main bodies, 
stiffeners, and diaphragms; and ( ) x  denotes the maximum Von-Mises stress in the physical 
part, estimated by the FE analysis under the selected load case. For efficient system reliability 
analysis, significant component events are identified as follows. By deterministic FE simulations 
using the mean values of the random variables, the locations with local maximum Von Mises 
stresses, i.e. “hot spots” are first identified. Filtering hot spots with insignificant levels of stresses, 
component failure events are defined at two hot spots for each arm. Considering two symmetric 
arms and two load cases, i.e., LC1 and LC2, a total of eight component failure events ,iE  
1,...,8,i   are identified. See Table 5.5 for the identified component events and the failure 
probabilities computed by component reliability analyses. The open-source reliability analysis 
software FERUM (Der Kiureghian et al. 2006) was linked with FE software ABAQUS® by 
Young Joo Lee for FORM analyses in conjunction with FE simulations (Lee et al. 2008). After 
FORM analysis, the components are described by standard normal random variables and 
reliability indexes, i.e. i iZ   , 1,...,8i  . The components E3 and E4 are neglected during the 
system reliability analysis because they are less than 5% of the probability of the most dominant 
component E5. Using FORM, the sensitivities of the component event probabilities with respect 
to distribution parameters (Bjerager and Krenk 1989) are also calculated. These component 
sensitivities are used in calculating the sensitivities of the system failure probability by use of the 
MSR method. In order to determine the statistical dependence between component events, the 
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correlation coefficient matrix of 1 2 5 6 7, , , ,Z Z Z Z Z  and 8Z  is constructed by using Eq. (5.19) 
as given in Table 5.6. This correlation coefficient matrix is fitted by the generalized DS class 
model, given in Eq. (3.16), successfully by using two CSRVs (DS fitting error: 1.68 %). 
First, a series system event consisting of the six components is considered. By Eq. (5.1) 
using direct numerical integration, the system failure probability is computed as 9.492×10–3. 
Comparison with the MCS result (109 samplings) 9.404×10–3 indicates that the MSR method 
provides a sufficiently accurate estimate. An important merit of the MSR method is that the 
failure probabilities of various system events can be estimated by replacing the event vector c , 
i.e. without probability computations. For example, suppose the event that at least one yielding 
failure occurs by the load combination 2 (LC2) while no failure occurs by LC1, i.e., 
1 2 5 6 7 8( )sysE E E E E E E       (5.26) 
is of interest. A new system vector of this system event can readily be constructed using the 
matrix procedure in Eq. (3.3), and recycle the probability vector that was used in the previous 
system reliability analysis. The probability of this system event is computed as 5.633×10–3, 
which is also sufficiently accurate, revealed by comparing against the results from the MCS (109 
samplings), 5.368×10–3. 
The sensitivities of the series system probability with respect to the means and standard 
deviations of the random variables are estimated based on the matrix-based formula in Eq. (5.5). 
In particular, the new procedure introduced in Section 5.3 is used for the system sensitivities with 
respect to the standard deviations. In order to use the correlation sensitivity /ij   derived for 
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linear limit state functions, instead of using a finite difference method, the given nonlinear limit 
state functions are linearized as follows. After finding the design point *u  and the linearized 
limit-state surface ˆ( )G  u αu  in the uncorrelated standard normal space, the failure event is 
described by a linearized limit-state function using a linear transformation ˆ  x DLu M , i.e. 
* *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( ) 0g g   x x x x   (5.27) 
where * *ˆ   xx DLu M  denotes an approximate design point in the original random variable 
space, and ( )g   denotes the gradient of the limit state function. The corresponding coefficients 
in the linear limit-state function in Eq. (5.15) are T *ˆ( )g a x  and * *0 ˆ ˆ( )a g  x x . Table 5.7 
shows the sensitivity-based importance measures of the means and standard deviation of the 19 
random variables, i.e.,  /i sys i iP      and  /i sys i iP     , where sysP  denotes the 
system failure probability of the aforementioned series system; i and i  denote the mean and 
standard deviation of the i-th random variable, 1,...,19i  . The importance measures indicate 
that random variables representing the uncertain load scales of wind loads, live load, and yield 
strengths of the main bodies are the most important random variables relative to the risk of the 
series system event. The sensitivities with respect to the yield strength of diaphragms are 
estimated to be zero because the hot spots in diaphragms are neglected during the system 
reliability analysis. The sensitivities in symmetric conditions show slightly different results due 
to numerical errors. The sensitivity-based importance measures by the MSR method compare to 
those by MCS (109 samplings). Despite the errors caused by the linearization, the parameter 
sensitivities by the developed method are close to those by the MCS. No comparisons are made 
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for the cases shown with “−” in the Table 5.7 because MCS provided insignificant sensitivity 
values.  
 
Table 5.4  Statistical properties of random variables in pylon system  
 Mean c.o.v. Distribution Type 
Young’s modulus 2×108 (KN/m2) 0.05 
Normal 
Yield strength 2.6×105 (KN/m2) 0.05 
Load scale 
factor 
Dead load 1.0 0.10 
Live load 1.0 0.20 
Wind load 1.0 0.40 
 
 
Table 5.5  Probabilities of component failure events by FORM analysis 
Component events  
Failure probability (× 
10–3) 
E1 (LC1; hot spot on right 
body) 
3.4342 
E2 (LC1; hot spot on left body) 3.4189 
E3 (LC1; hot spot on right 
stiffener) 
0.1332 
E4 (LC1; hot spot on left 
stiffener) 
0.1340 
85 
 
 
E5 (LC2; hot spot on right 
body) 
5.4255 
E6 (LC2; hot spot on left body) 5.4079 
E7 (LC2; hot spot on right 
stiffener) 
0.2910 
E8 (LC2; hot spot on left 
stiffener) 
0.2925 
 
Table 5.6  Correlation coefficient matrix of six component failure events 
Correlation Z1 Z2 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 
Z1 1 0.9887 0.6129 0.6040 0.6032 0.6032 
Z2  1 0.6040 0.6129 0.6032 0.6032 
Z5   1 0.9929 0.9826 0.9826 
Z6    1 0.9826 0.9826 
Z7  Symmetric  1 0.9906 
Z8      1 
 
Table 5.5  (cont.) 
86 
 
Table 5.7  Sensitivity-based importance measures of the means and standard deviations of the 
random variables relative to series system probability 
Random variables 
sys
i i
i
P    
sys
i i
i
P    
MSR MCS MSR MCS 
Young’s 
modulus 
Diaphragm (Left) –2.558×10
-22 — –1.175×10-27 — 
Diaphragm (Right) –6.335×10
-8 — 1.422×10-9 — 
Body (Left) –3.552×10
-22 — –2.279×10-27 — 
Body (Right) 7.887×10
-6 — –1.753×10-6 — 
Stiffener (Left) –4.140×10
-25 — –1.049×10-27 — 
Stiffener (Right) –7.817×10
-6 — –8.985×10-7 — 
Load 
scale 
factor 
Dead load (Self 
weight) 
2.709×10-4 — 6.530×10-6 — 
Dead load (Pre-
stress) 
6.319×10-4 — 3.603×10-5 — 
Live load 2.596×10
-3 2.798×10-3 1.919×10-3 2.137×10-3 
In-service wind 
load 
(In-plane) 
7.690×10-3 8.256×10-3 1.812×10-2 2.022×10-2 
In-service wind 
load 
(Out-of-plane) 
1.452×10-3 1.547×10-3 2.940×10-3 3.189×10-3 
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Random variables 
sys
i i
i
P    
sys
i i
i
P    
MSR MCS MSR MCS 
Load 
scale 
factor 
Out-of-service 
wind load (In-
plane) 
1.372×10-2 1.363×10-2 3.279×10-2 3.368×10-2 
Out-of-service 
wind load (Out-of-
plane) 
2.450×10-3 2.446×10-3 5.235×10-3 5.153×10-3 
Yield 
strength  
Body (Left) –3.322×10
-3 — 3.009×10-3 — 
Stiffener (Left) –4.495×10
-14 — 8.093×10-5 — 
Diaphragm (Left) 0 — 0 — 
Body (Right) –3.710×10
-3 — 2.964×10-3 — 
Stiffener (Right) –2.333×10
-14 — 8.170×10-5 — 
Diaphragm (Right) 0 — 0 — 
Table 5.7  (cont.) 
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Chapter 6  Post-disaster Damage Detection for Pipeline Networks by 
Matrix-based System Reliability Analysis 
6.1. Introduction 
Urban lifeline networks are large and complex systems consisting of a variety of structural 
components that are spatially distributed. When a natural or man-made hazard occurs, these 
networks are often susceptible to structural failures of multiple components such as pipe 
leakages and breakages. For timely recovery of the utility services in the impacted areas, rapid 
post-disaster inspections and repairs are desirable. However, inspections of all individual pipes in 
terms of leakages and breakages are often impractical since they are mostly buried underground 
and excavations would require exceedingly large costs and time. Therefore, it is desirable to have 
a stochastic framework that can estimate the conditional probabilities of structural damage of 
network components given network flow monitoring data such that components with higher 
likelihood of damage can be inspected with a priority. The framework needs to account for the 
uncertainties in component damage and their impacts on the system-level performance through 
efficient and accurate system reliability analyses.  
This chapter aims to develop two efficient system reliability methods to facilitate 
stochastic damage detection of pipeline networks. First, a system reliability method is developed 
to quantify uncertainty in the pipeline network flow quantities for a given earthquake scenario. 
Due to the complex relationship between network flow quantities and component damage states, 
89 
 
many studies in the literature used simulation-based methods to quantify the uncertainty. 
Recently, Lee et al. (2011) developed a non-simulation-based method by generalizing the 
Matrix-based System Reliability (MSR) method (Kang et al. 2008, Song & Kang 2009). The 
method allows for efficient time-varying system reliability analysis of transportation networks 
with structural deterioration of bridges considered. However, the size of the vectors used by the 
MSR method increases exponentially as the number of components increases, which requires 
high computational costs and memory. In this chapter, a new method is proposed to construct the 
vectors efficiently without compromising accuracy. Using a selective search scheme that is often 
seen in identifying critical failure modes of complex structural systems (Murotsu 1984, Guenard 
1984), probabilities of system states with higher likelihood are evaluated with a priority. 
Second, a system reliability method is proposed to estimate the conditional probabilities 
of water pipeline damage given flow monitoring data, based on the Bayesian framework 
introduced in Poulakis et al. (2003) and the MSR method. Finding such conditional probabilities 
is even more time-consuming than system uncertainty quantification. To overcome this 
computational challenge, the proposed method finds the optimal problem size for efficient and 
accurate stochastic damage detection. 
Both methods are applied to a water distribution network with 15 pipelines subjected to 
an earthquake event. The uncertain network flows are quantified based on fragility models of 
pipes and network flow analysis. The conditional probabilities of pipeline damage given outflow 
observations are also estimated for damage detection purpose. The results are compared to those 
by existing methods.  
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6.2. Proposed System Reliability Methods 
6.2.1. Uncertainty Quantification of System Quantity 
Consider a system consisting of n  components. The i-th component has id  prescribed 
damage states, 1,..., .i n  Thus, the system has a total of 1 2 nd d d   system states 
determined by component damage states. Let ,( )i jP , 1,..., ,i n 1,..., ,ij d  denote the probability 
that the i-th component is in the j-th damage state. If all the component events are statistically 
independent of each other, the probability of each system state is obtained as the product of the 
corresponding component probabilities, i.e. 
 
1 2 1 2
(1,1,...,1) 1,(1) 2,(1) , (1)
(2,1,...,1) 1,(2) 2,(1) , (1)
( , ,..., ) 1,( ) 2,( ) , ( )n n
n
n
d d d d d n d
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
                         
p


 

 (6.1) 
where p  is the “probability vector” (Lee et al. 2011), and ( )P  denotes the probability of the 
system state determined by the damage states of the components shown in the subscript. For 
example, (2,1,…,1) indicates that all the components are in the first damage state except that the 
first component is in the second damage state. 
Next, we introduce the “component quantity” to represent the performance of the 
component in a particular damage state. For example, the flow capacity of a pipeline can be 
considered as a component quantity during a system reliability analysis. Let 
,( ) ,i jq 1,..., ,i n 1,..., ij d  denote the component quantity of the i-th component in the j-th 
damage state, which corresponds to ,( )i jP . For a given set of component quantities, one can find 
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the corresponding performance of the system, which is represented by a “system quantity.” For 
example, the flow capacity of a network can be considered as a system quantity. This system 
quantity can be obtained by a problem-specific algorithm for a given set of component quantities. 
For each system state shown in Eq. (6.1), the system quantities can be evaluated as follows. 
 
1 2 1 2
(1,1,...,1) 1,(1) 2,(1) ,(1)
(2,1,...,1) 1,(2) 2,(1) ,(1)
( , ,..., ) 1,( ) 2,( ) ,( )
( , ,..., )
( , ,..., )
( , ,..., )
n n
n
n
d d d d d n d
Q f q q q
Q f q q q
Q f q q q
                   
q    (6.2) 
where q  is termed the “quantity vector” (Lee et al. 2011), ( )Q  denotes the system quantity of 
the system state determined by the component states in the subscript, and f( ) denotes the 
problem-specific algorithm or function that evaluates the system quantity for the given set of 
component quantities. For example, the maximum flow capacity algorithm was used in Lee et al. 
(2011) to evaluate the network flow capacity as a system quantity of a bridge transportation 
network.  
Using the probability vector (Eq. (6.1)) and the quantity vector (Eq. (6.2)), one can 
obtain probability functions and statistical parameters of the system quantity of interest, Q by 
matrix calculations (Lee et al. 2011). For example, the mean, variance and the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the system quantity are calculated respectively as follows. 
 
T
2 T 2
:
( .* )
( ) ( )
i
Q
Q Q
Q i
i q q
F q P Q q p
 
 
  
   
q p
p q q  (6.3) 
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where “.*” denotes the element-wise multiplication of the two vectors, and ip  and iq  are the i-
th element of the vectors p and q, respectively. 
Note that this matrix-based approach decouples two tasks ‘system (or network) analysis’ 
and ‘probability calculations’ such that introduction of additional system quantities to the 
analysis does not require re-computing the probabilities. On the other hand, changes in 
probabilities due to time-varying performance of components, often caused by structural 
deterioration in civil infrastructures, do not require re-performing network flow analyses (Lee et 
al. 2011). 
6.2.2. Selective Search Scheme for Uncertainty Quantification of Large Systems 
The uncertainty quantification method described in Section 6.2.1 may require a huge 
computational cost for a large system despite the schemes developed to construct the vectors 
efficiently (Kang et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2011). This is because the number of the system states, 
i.e. 1 2 nd d d   increases exponentially with the number of components. In this study, we 
propose an efficient system uncertainty quantification method, which identifies and evaluates 
more critical (i.e. more likely) system states instead of evaluating all elements in the vectors. The 
proposed approach uses a selective search scheme, which is often used in so-called branch-and-
bound methods (Murotsu 1984, Guenard 1984, Lee & Song 2010) to identify critical failure 
sequences of complex structural systems. 
The procedure starts from the probability vector of a subsystem with the first component 
only, i.e., 
1
T
1,(1) 1,( )[ , , ] .dP P The first step, which is termed as a “search” process, is to find the 
93 
 
element with the maximum value in the current vector. Then, we multiply the element by the 
vector of the next component, 
2
T
2,(1) 2, ( )[ , , ] ,dP P which is termed as a “branching” process. Then, 
the total size of the probability vector increases to 1 2( 1).d d   Next, we perform a search 
process again, i.e. find the maximum value among the 1 2( 1)d d   elements in the vector. If the 
element with the maximum value is one of the elements that have not been branched out yet, we 
multiply the element by the vector of the second component, 
2
T
2,(1) 2,( )[ , , ]dP P to increase the 
vector size to 1 2( 2 2).d d   If the element is one of the elements that has been branched out, 
we multiply it by the vector of the next component, 
3
T
3,(1) 3,( )[ , , ]dP P to increase the vector size 
to 1 2 3( 2).d d d    The search and branching processes are repeated to identify and evaluate 
the probabilities of critical (i.e. more likely) system states with a priority as an approximation of 
the complete probability vector in Eq. (6.1). 
After each search process, we check if the element of the maximum value contains all n 
components in the product. If that is the case, the maximum value and the corresponding system 
state are stored, and the element of the second highest system probability is branched out to 
continue the process. Critical system states and their probabilities are collected until the sum of 
the system state probabilities reaches a value close to 1.0. The size of this partial probability 
vector is significantly smaller than the full vector in Eq. (6.1) because many system states often 
have negligible likelihoods. The stored values are then divided by their sum, so that the sum of 
the probabilities in the partial vector is 1.0. By replacing the complete probability vector in Eq. 
(6.3) by the normalized partial probability vector, one can perform uncertainty quantification of 
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a system quantity as explained in Section 6.2.1 with significantly reduced computer memory 
requirement and improved efficiency.  
6.2.3. Bayesian Method for Stochastic System Damage Detection 
When post-disaster observations on system quantities, 1 2{ , ,..., }mQ Q QQ  (e.g. outflow 
quantities at different locations in a network) are available, we can update the probabilities of 
system states (described in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2) based on the system state observations for 
damage detection purpose. This stochastic damage detection process should account for various 
uncertainties such as those in flow measurement, statistical parameters in fragility models, and 
mathematical models introduced for components and system quantity. However, modeling each 
of these uncertainties individually is often challenging due to the lack of knowledge and data. 
Therefore, this study deals with these uncertainties by introducing random variables describing 
the uncertain errors in predicting the system quantity by the mathematical model of the system. 
In the numerical example of this study, the error of each system state prediction is described by a 
zero-mean normal random variable. 
Using a Bayesian framework (Poulakis et al. 2003), the conditional probabilities of 
system states given post-disaster observations on system quantities, 1 2{ , ,..., }mQ Q QQ  are 
evaluated as follows.  
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1 2
1 2 1 2
(1,1, ,1)|
(2,1, ,1)|
( , , , )|
(1,1,..,1) (1,1,...,1)
1
(2,1,..,1) (2,1,...,1)
1
( , ,.., ) ( , ,..., )
1
[( ) / ]
[( ) / ]1
[( ) / ]
n
n n
d d d
m
k k
k
m
k k
k
m
k k
d d d d d d
k
P
P
P
Q Q P
Q Q P
C
Q Q P



       
                



Q
Q
Q
Q
p






 (6.4) 
where Qp  denotes the probability vector updated by the observation Q , ( )|P Q  is the 
conditional probability of the system state given the observation Q , ( )
kQ  is the k-th system 
quantity predicted by a problem-specific algorithm,    denotes the probability density function 
of the standard normal distribution,  is the standard deviation of the normal random variable 
introduced to describe the uncertain error of the system quantity prediction, and C  is the 
normalization factor that makes the sum of the elements in the vector unity. 
The size of this vector also increases exponentially with the number of component 
events. However, the selective search scheme introduced in Section 6.2.2 is not applicable to this 
vector. The scheme compares the terms in the incomplete probability vector during intermediate 
steps to expand more likely system states with a priority. For the vector in Eq. (6.4), however, 
the probability terms involve ( )
kQ  , which can be evaluated only for fully expanded (i.e. 
containing all components) system states. 
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To overcome this, a method is proposed to obtain the updated system state probabilities 
efficiently. The main idea is to reduce the number of system states by combining damage states 
of selected components. Suppose we aim to obtain the conditional probability of damage for the 
l-th component in the system. First, we combine the damage states of all components except the 
l-th component such that each component has only one damage state, and thus becomes 
deterministic. This reduces the number of the system states to .ld  The mean of the component 
quantities is chosen as the deterministic component quantity after the damage states are 
combined. The mean of the i-th component quantity (il), iq  is obtained as 
,( ) ,( )
1
id
i i j i j
j
q P q

    (6.5) 
Next, we try to restore the damage states of one of the components to reduce the error. In order to 
gain maximum improvement in the accuracy, we aim to find the component whose recovery of 
the damage states would make the biggest change in the probability of the l-th component’s 
damage. This component damage probability can be obtained by summing up the elements in Eq. 
(6.4) that belongs to the damage case of the l-th component. For each component except the l-th, 
we compute the probability and find the component whose recovery makes the biggest change. 
The number of the system states is then multiplied by the number of the damage states of the 
selected component. We repeat this process until the damage probability of the l-th component 
converges. This study uses the following convergence criterion: 
,
D D
l l prevP P     (6.6) 
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where DlP  denotes the probability of the l-th component’s damage by the current updated 
probability vector, ,
D
l prevP  is the probability at the previous step, and ε  is a small threshold 
value. 
6.3. Illustrative Example 
In this section, a small network example is provided to illustrate the methods and procedures 
proposed in the previous sections.  
6.3.1. Problem Description and Uncertainty Quantification  
Consider the water network with four pipes shown in Figure 6.1. There are one inflow and one 
outflow, and their flow rates are equally 1.0 when there is no damage to the network. Dimensions 
are ignored for simplicity. As shown in Figure 6.1, the inflow is divided into pipes 1 and 2 with 
the ratio of 0.9 to 0.1 and merged. Then, it is divided into pipes 3 and 4 with the ratio of 0.9 to 
0.1 and merged again into the outflow.  
1
2
3
4
1.0
0.9 0.9
0.1 0.1
1.0 1.0 OutflowIntflow
 
Figure 6.1 A water pipe network with 4 components 
 
If an earthquake event occurs, each of the four pipes sustains one of the following three damage 
states in terms of water flow rate loss: 0%, 50%, and 100% loss with the probabilities 0.6, 0.3, 
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and 0.1, respectively. Since each pipe has three possible damage states, the four pipes have a 
total of 3 3 3 3 81     system states, and if all the component events are statistically 
independent, their probabilities are obtained using Eq. (6.1):  
(1,1,1,1) 1,(1) 2,(1) 3,(1) 4,(1)
(2,1,1,1) 1,(2) 2,(1) 3,(1) 4,(1)
(3,3,3,3) 1,(3) 2,(3) 3,(3) 4,(3)
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
P P P P P
P P P P P
P P P P P
                                              
p   
0.1296
0.0648
0.0001
         
  (6.7) 
and the corresponding system quantities are obtained using Eq. (6.2): 
 
(1,1,1,1) 1,(1) 2,(1) 3,(1) 4,(1)
(2,1,1,1) 1,(2) 2,(1) 3,(1) 4,(1)
(3,3,3,3) 1,(3) 2,(3) 3,(3) 4,(3)
( , , , ) 1.00
( , , , ) 0.55
( , , , ) 0.00
Q f q q q q
Q f q q q q
Q f q q q q
                                   
q     (6.8) 
where ,( ) ,i jP 1, 2,3, 4,i  1, 2,3j   denotes the probability of the system state determined by the 
j-th damage states of the i-th components where the values of i and j are shown in the subscript 
of each term; ,( ) ,i jq 1,2,3,4,i  1,2,3j   denote the component quantity of the i-th component 
in the j-th damage state, which corresponds to ,( )i jP ; ( )Q  denotes the outflow rate which is 
determined by the component states in the subscript; and f( ) denotes the function that evaluates 
the outflow rate for the given set of component quantities. For example, the first rows of both 
Eqs. (6.7) and (6.8) are calculated when the four pipes have no damage, and the second rows 
when the flow rate of the first pipe reduces by 50%. The statistical parameters of Eqs. (6.7) and 
(6.8) are obtained as follows using Eq. (6.3),: 
99 
 
   
T
2 T 2
0.5625
( .* ) 0.1123
Q
Q Q
  
   
q p
p q q
 (6.9) 
6.3.2. Efficient Uncertainty Quantification of Outflow 
Next, the efficient system uncertainty quantification method proposed in Section 6.2.2 is applied 
to this illustrative example. The overall procedure of the selective search scheme is illustrated in 
Figure 6.2. The procedure starts from the probability vector of the first component, i.e., 
T T
1,(1) 1,(2) 1,(3)[ , , ] [0.6, 0.3, 0.1] .P P P  The first step is a search process which finds the maximum 
value in the current vector, which is 1,(1)P = 0.6. Then, a branching process is performed by 
multiplying the element by the vector of the second component, 
T T
2,(1) 2,(2) 2,(3)[ , , ] [0.6, 0.3, 0.1] .P P P  Now the total size of the probability vector increases to 5. 
Next a search process is performed again to find the maximum value in the expanded vector, 
which is the first element, 0.36, and a branching process is performed by multiplying the element 
by the vector of the third component, T T3,(1) 3,(2) 3,(3)[ , , ] [0.6, 0.3, 0.1] .P P P  Another search 
process finds the maximum value, which is the sixth element, 0.30. Since this value did not 
branch out yet, it is multiplied by the vector of the second component, 
T T
2,(1) 2,(2) 2,(3)[ , , ] [0.6, 0.3, 0.1] .P P P  In this manner, these search and branching processes are 
repeated three times more, and a 16 element vector is obtained. At this moment, the maximum 
element is the first element, which is 0.1296. Note that this element is now fully branched out 
until the fourth component, and there are no more components. Therefore, the value is found as 
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the highest probability among the 81 system states. More searches are done for the remaining 
elements of the probability vector to find the probabilities from highest to lowest.  
 
1,(1) 2,(1) 3,(1)
1,(1) 2,(1) 1,(1) 2,(1) 3,(2)
1,(1) 2,(2) 1,(1) 2,(1) 3,(3)1,(1)
1,(1) 2,(3) 1,(1) 2,(2)1,(2)
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0.6
0
P P P
P P P P P
P P P P PP
P P P PP
P P PP
P P
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                                          
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Figure 6.2 Procedure of selective search scheme 
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In this example, the selective search processes are repeated until the sum of the probabilities 
reaches 0.9513, where 48 system states are obtained. For normalization, each element is divided 
by 0.9513 so that the sum of the vector elements becomes unity. Then, the statistical parameters 
are obtained from Eq. (6.3): 
   
T
2 T 2
0.5847
( .* ) 0.1053
Q
Q Q
  
   
q p
p q q
 (6.10) 
which are close to the results in Eq. (6.9). Also, the CDF of the outflow is plotted and compared 
to the exact solution obtained from the full set.  
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Figure 6.3 Cumulative distribution functions of outflow 
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6.3.3. Stochastic Damage Detection of Water Pipeline Network 
Suppose, after an earthquake event, the outflow rates are observed as 0.70. Using the Bayesian 
method introduced in Section 6.2.3, we can calculate the updated probability of the damage to 
each pipe, where the damage is defined such that each pipe experiences 50% or 100% water loss. 
If each pipe experiences 0% water loss, it is considered to be no damage. All of the errors 
involved in this updating process are represented together as a Gaussian random variable with 
zero-mean and the standard deviations  assumed to be 1% of the inflow rate 1.0. The first step 
of the method is to update the probability vector in Eq. (6.7) based on the observed system 
quantity as follows:   
(1,1,1,1)| (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
(2,1,1,1)| (2,1,1,1) (2,1,1,1)
(3,3,3,3)| (3,3,3,3) (3,3,3,3)
[( ) / ] 0.0149
[( ) / ] 0.02941
[( ) / ] 0.0000
Q
Q
Q
Q
P Q Q P
P Q Q P
C
P Q Q P
                                            
p     (6.11) 
where Qp  denotes the probability vector updated by the observation 0.70Q  , ( )|QP  is the 
conditional probability of each system state for the observation 0.70Q  , ( )Q  is the system 
quantity predicted by Eq. (6.8),    denotes the probability density function of the standard 
normal distribution,  is the standard deviation of the Gaussian random variable 
introduced to describe the uncertain error of the system quantity prediction, and C  is the 
normalization factor that makes the sum of the elements in the vector to be unity.  
By summing up the updated probabilities corresponding to the damage of each 
component, the damage probability of each component is calculated. For example, the 
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component damage probability of the first pipe is calculated by summing up the probabilities 
corresponding to a damage state in which the first pipe sustains 50% or 100% water loss. By 
summing up the elements whose first subscript is 2 or 3 in Eq. (6.11), the component damage 
probability of the first pipe is calculated as 0.3678.  
By using the method proposed in Section 6.2.3, the computational effort can be reduced. 
We combine the damage states of all components except the first one such that the second, third, 
and fourth components each have now only one damage state, i.e., the probabilities of the second, 
third, and fourth components are equally 1. The number of the system states is now reduced to 3 
instead of 81. The quantities of the second, third, and fourth components are represented by their 
means since now they are deterministic. Using Eq. (6.5), the means are obtained as 
3
2 2,( ) 2,( )
1
0.75,j j
j
q P q

   33 3,( ) 3,( )
1
0.75,j j
j
q P q

   and 34 4,( ) 4,( )
1
0.75.j j
j
q P q

    Using these 
quantities, we can update the probabilities of the three system states based on the observed 
system quantity, 0.70Q  , as follows:   
 
(1,1,1,1)| (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
(2,1,1,1)| (2,1,1,1) (2,1,1,1)
(3,1,1,1)| (3,1,1,1) (3,1,1,1)
[( ) / ] 0.9952
1 [( ) / ] 0.0048
[( ) / ] 0.0000
Q
Q Q
Q
P Q Q P
P Q Q P
C
P Q Q P
                                     
p  (6.12) 
In this vector, the sum of the second and third elements denotes the component damage 
probability of the first pipe, which is 0.0048. Since we are not sure if this result is accurate 
enough, we restore the damage states of the one of the second, third, or fourth components from 
which maximum improvement in accuracy is gained. The component is determined by finding 
the component whose recovery of the damage states makes the biggest change in the probability 
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of the first component’s damage. The component damage probabilities of the first pipe after 
restoring each of the second, third, and fourth components are computed to be 0.0061, 0.3989, 
and 0.0056, respectively, and the recovery of the third component shows the biggest difference in 
the probability. At this point, we have 9 system states by recovering the third component’s three 
damage states. Since the difference between the previous and current results is relatively large, 
we recover either the second or fourth component. The component damage probabilities of the 
first pipe after recovering each of the second and fourth components are computed to be 0.3964 
and 0.3658, respectively. Since the recovery of the fourth component shows a larger difference 
than that of the second, we restore the three component states of the fourth component. We stop 
restoring here, since the difference between the previous and current results is 0.0031, which is 
small enough. Note that the result 0.3658 is now very close to the true solution of 0.3678 
obtained from the 81 system states. 
6.4. Application to a Water Pipeline Network 
6.4.1. Description of Water Pipeline Network  
To demonstrate the methods proposed in Section 6.2, let us consider the water pipeline network 
shown in Figure 6.4. The network consists of 15 pipes (links) indexed by the numbers in circles. 
The pipeline intersections (nodes) are indexed by the numbers in squares. The network receives 
water inflow from a tank and distributes the water through three outflow locations. It is assumed 
that for the inflow rate 0.1 m3/sec, the rate of each outflow for undamaged condition is 0.0333 
m3/s. 
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Figure 6.4 A water pipe network with 15 components 
The flow rates of the undamaged pipes, ,iq 1,...,15,i   are computed using the following 
equation (Lewis et al. 2004): 
 
4 (1) (2)
128
i i i
i
i
D p pq
L
      
 (6.13) 
where iD  and iL  are the diameter and the length of the i-th pipe ( 1,...,15i  ),  (=9.6×104 
N·s/m2) is the dynamic viscosity of water, and (1)ip  and 
(2)
ip are the pressures at the node with 
the lower index number and that with the higher index number of the i-th pipe, respectively. The 
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diameter of each pipe is assumed to be 0.25 m while the lengths of the pipes are given as 1.0, 1.0, 
1.0, 1.0, 2.1, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.7, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.1, and 2.0 km (from Pipe 1 to 15). The pipe 
flow rates for a given set of inflow and outflow values are obtained as follows. At each node, the 
sum of the flow rates should be zero. For example, at Node 1, the sum of 1 3,  q q  and the inflow 
rate is zero; at Node 2, the sum of 1 2,  q q  and 4q  is zero. These 11 equations representing 
nodal equilibrium conditions are described in terms of 15 pipe flow rates ,iq 1,...,15.i   By 
replacing these by the right-hand side of Eq. (6.13), we obtain 11 equations given in terms of 
(1)
ip and
(2) ,ip  1,...,15.i   These pressure terms can be replaced by the pressures at the 
corresponding nodes. Therefore, one can solve these 11 equations for the 11 nodal pressures. 
Then, we substitute these into Eq. (6.13) to obtain the pipe flow rates iq , 1,...,15.i    
When the water pipe network is subjected to an earthquake event, pipes are likely to be 
damaged, which reduces the flow rates. The failure probabilities of the pipes are estimated by use 
of the following “repair rate” given as a function of the peak ground velocity (PGV) in the 
HAZUS technical manual (FEMA 2003), which is defined as the average number of failures per 
unit length (km) of a pipe: 
  2.25repair rate 0.0001 (PGV)    (6.14) 
The failure probability of each pipe is approximately computed by the product of the pipe’s 
length and the repair rate. This is a reasonable approximation for small probabilities. For more 
realistic modeling, however, one needs to use a homogeneous or nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process. It is also noted that this chapter deals with failures by ground shaking only by use of the 
repair rate model in Eq. (6.14), while the ground failure is ignored. 
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The PGV is computed from the following attenuation relationship (Campbell 1997): 
 
 
 
ln(PGV) ln(PGA) 0.26 0.29
1.44ln 0.0203exp(0.958 )
1.89ln 0.361exp(0.576 )
(0.0001 0.000565 ) 0.12
0.15 0.30
0.75tanh(0.51 )(1 ) ( )
SR SR
HR V
M
r M
r M
M r F
S S
D S f D
   
 
 
  
 
 
 (6.15) 
where 
 
2 2
ln(PGA) 3.512 0.904
1.328ln{ [0.149exp(0.647 )] }
[1.125 0.112ln 0.0957 ]
[0.440 0.171ln ]
[0.405 0.222ln ]
SR
HR
M
r M
r M F
r S
r S
   
 
  
 
 
 (6.16) 
where PGA is the peak ground acceleration, M denotes the earthquake magnitude, assumed to 
be 7.0 for the earthquake scenario in this example, F  represents the fault type, assumed to be 
0  for strike-slip type faulting, SRS  and HRS  define the local site conditions, assumed to be 
alluvium or firm soil ( 0),SR HRS S   D  denotes the depth to bedrock, assumed to be 0.45 km, 
and r  is the distance between the center of each pipe and the epicenter. The distances between 
the pipes and the epicenter are 5.7, 6.3, 5.0, 5.6, 6.1, 4.8, 4.1, 4.8, 4.1, 5.0, 3.4, 4.1, 5.6, 4.1, and 
4.7 km (From Pipe 1 to 15). For D<1 km, fV(D) is given as  
 ( ) 0.30(1 )(1 ) 0.15(1 )V HR SRf D S D D S       (6.17) 
The failure event of a pipe is further divided into three damage states in terms of the water flow 
rate losses: 25%, 50%, and 100% losses. Their probabilities are assumed to be 0.75, 0.07, and 
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0.18, respectively, which are modified from a proposed water loss distribution in Zolfaghari and 
Niari (2009). Thus, the probabilities of these three damage states of each pipe given an 
earthquake magnitude are computed by the product of the failure probability obtained by use of 
the repair rate in Eq. (6.14) and the probabilities of water losses. There is one more case, 0% 
water loss, and the corresponding probability is one minus the failure probability of the pipe. In 
sum, each pipe has four damage states represented by 0%, 25%, 50%, and 100% water loss. 
Therefore, there exist four component quantities, i.e. qi,(1)=qi, qi,(2)=0.75qi, qi,(3)=0.5qi and qi,(4) =0. 
The corresponding component probabilities Pi,(1), Pi,(2), Pi,(3) and Pi,(4) are computed as explained 
above. 
6.4.2. Uncertainty Quantification of Outflows of Water Pipe Network 
Due to the water losses of pipes after an earthquake event, the flow rates of the three outflows 
may be reduced. Since each pipe has four damage states, we deal with a total of 15 94 ( 10 )  
system damage states, for each of which the three outflows have the corresponding flow rates. 
The outflow rates can be computed using the nodal equilibriums explained in the previous 
section, given the flow rates of the pipes, ,( ) ,i jq  for each system state. This process is denoted 
by the function f( ) in Eq. (6.2). 
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Figure 6.5 Cumulative distribution functions of Outflow 1 for M=7.0. 
 
The probability vector and three quantity vectors (one for each outflow) are obtained by Eq. 
(6.1) and Eq. (6.2), respectively. Using matrix calculations of these vectors (e.g. Eq. (6.3)), one 
can quantify the uncertainties of the outflows in terms of probability functions and statistical 
parameters. The method proposed in Section 6.2.2 can be used to handle a large number of 
system damage states efficiently. For example, Figure 6.5 shows the CDF of Outflow 1 after 
probabilities of system states are searched until the sum of the probabilities reaches 0.7. The 
cumulative frequency diagram obtained by Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) with 105 samples 
confirms reasonable accuracy of the proposed method. Using the same probability vector, the 
probabilities that the outflow quantity belongs to intervals with 0.001 widths are also obtained 
and compared with those estimated by the MCS. Table 6.1 shows that the probabilities obtained 
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by the two methods match well for the seven most likely intervals. It is noted that the proposed 
method needed only two minutes while the MCS required one hour (both using Matlab® on a 
personal computer with an AMD dual core 2.0 GHz). As we expand the probability vector such 
that the sum of the probabilities reaches 0.7, we evaluated the outflows of the network for 13,008 
system states among around a billion cases. This demonstrates that the proposed method can 
perform uncertainty quantification for a large system accurately without evaluating the 
probabilities and system performances for too many system states. 
 
Table 6.1  Probabilities of the seven most likely intervals of Outflow 1 for M=7.0. 
 
Outflow 1 
Method proposed 
in Section 6.2.2 
MCS 
(105 samples) 
0.033~0.0333 0.5809 0.5363 
0.032~0.033 0.1820 0.1811 
0.024~0.025 0.0782 0.0860 
0.025~0.026 0.0529 0.0525 
0.030~0.031 0.0424 0.0502 
0.000~0.001 0.0154 0.0216 
0.002~0.003 0.0150 0.0178 
 
6.4.3. Stochastic Damage Detection of Water Pipeline Network 
Suppose, after an earthquake event with M=7.0 occurs, the three outflow rates are observed as 
1.20×102, 2.05×102 and 1.21×103 m3/s (from Outflow 1 to 3). Using the Bayesian method 
introduced in Section 6.2.3, we calculate the updated probabilities that the pipes are damaged 
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and thus experience any loss of water flow rate, i.e., 25%, 50% or 100% water loss. In order to 
account for the aforementioned uncertainties in the problem, the errors in the system quantity 
predictions are assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian random variables with the standard deviations 
 assumed to be 1% of the inflow rate 0.1 m3/s. Due to the exceedingly large size of the vector, 
the updated probability vector in Eq. (6.4) cannot be evaluated directly or by MCS. 
To test the accuracy of the method proposed in Section 6.2.3, we evaluate the updated 
probability vector in Eq. (6.4) completely using a supercomputer (Abe Dell Intel 64 Linux 
Cluster), i.e. without using the approximation by the method. A total of 15 94 ( 10 )  flow 
analyses are required. By summing up the updated probabilities corresponding to the damage of 
each component, the component damage probability is calculated (see Figure 6.6). Next, the 
same analysis is conducted by Matlab® on a personal computer with AMD dual core 2.0 GHz, 
using the efficient method proposed in Section 6.2.3. The convergence criterion in Eq. (6.6) is 
slightly modified as follows to perform stochastic damage detection of multiple pipes in parallel:  
 ,
1
1 n D D
i i prev
i
P P
n 
    (6.18) 
where n=15 is the number of the components, and =0.15 is the threshold value used in this 
example. This convergence criterion indicates that the analysis is continued until the average 
error of the component damage probabilities is smaller than the prescribed threshold value . 
Although the analysis stopped after only 6 of 15 components recovered a full set of damage 
states, the results in Figure 6.7 show a good agreement with those by the complete vector 
evaluated by the supercomputer (Figure 6.6). 
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Figure 6.6 Component damage probabilities based on the complete vector of the updated 
probabilities obtained by a supercomputer (=1% of inflow). 
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Figure 6.7 Component damage probabilities based on the incomplete vector of the updated 
probabilities obtained by the method proposed in Section 6.2.3 (=1% of inflow). 
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From these results, we observe that Pipes 1 and 2 have almost 100% chance to be damaged given 
post-disaster outflows, which means they should be inspected with a top priority. Pipes 3 and 5 
also have relatively high chances of damage and need to be inspected. 
Figure 6.8 shows the results obtained by evaluating the updated probability terms only 
for the system states identified by the method proposed in Section 6.2.2 (the sum of the 
probabilities of the system states are 70%). This method fails to identify the components with 
higher likelihood of damage (Pipes 1, 2, 3, 5 and 13 in Figure 6.6). Figure 6.9 shows the 
component damage probabilities estimated by Monte Carlo Simulation (105 samples). Even after 
a three-day analysis (by the same personal computer), the component damage probabilities are 
significantly different from the true solutions in Figure 6.6 and fail to identify most critical 
components. 
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Figure 6.8 Component damage probabilities based on the elements of the updated probability 
vector that correspond to the system states identified by the method in Section 6.2.2 
(=1% of inflow). 
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Figure 6.9 Component damage probabilities by Monte Carlo simulations (105 samples, =1% 
of inflow). 
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In order to test the impact of the assumed value of  in Eq. (6.4), two higher levels of errors 
5%   and 10%  of the inflow are used. Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 show the component 
damage probabilities obtained by the method proposed in Section 6.2.3 with 5% and 10% errors, 
respectively. It is seen that the damage probabilities of Pipes 1 and 2 remain the highest but 
decrease while other pipes’ probabilities increase, which makes damage detection a challenging 
task. As the errors increase even more, the post-disaster damage probabilities approach the 
original probabilities before observations because the likelihood functions in the Bayesian 
framework do not provide much information about damage due to large uncertainties in the 
prediction by the mathematical model. Further study is needed to find actual level of the 
uncertainties in stochastic damage detection. 
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Figure 6.10 Component damage probabilities based on the incomplete vector of the updated 
probabilities obtained by the method proposed in Section 6.2.3 (=5% of inflow). 
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Figure 6.11 Component damage probabilities based on the incomplete vector of the updated 
probabilities obtained by the method proposed in Section 6.2.3 (=10% of inflow). 
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Chapter 7  Sequential Compounding Method (SCM) 
7.1. Introduction 
The MSR method (Chapter 3) has many merits over existing system reliability analysis methods 
as demonstrated by its applications to complex structural systems and network (Chapter 4). 
However, the size of the problem increases exponentially with the number of the components, 
which requires multi-scale analysis approaches or selective expansion scheme (Chapter 6) for 
large size systems. The generalized DS model may not fit a certain correlation coefficient matrix 
using a small number of CSRVs. In order to overcome these challenges regarding the size of the 
system and the correlation coefficient matrix, the sequential compounding method was 
developed. The proposed method compounds two components coupled by a logical operation 
(e.g. union or intersection) sequentially until the system event of interest is simplified into a 
single compound event. Since it deals with the logical operation of only two components each 
time, the compounding process would not be encumbered by the complexity of the logical 
description of a given general system. This chapter introduces the compounding procedures 
developed for two components coupled by intersection or union, and explains the overall 
sequential compounding scheme toward the final solution. 
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7.2. Compounding Two Components Coupled by Intersection 
Let us consider two components 1E  and 2E  coupled by intersection. The goal is to compound 
these into a single equivalent event 1 2andE . For example, they can appear in a parallel system or 
a cut-set system, and can be compounded as follows.  
1 2 10 1 2 3 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
and
and
P E E E P E E E
P E E E E E E E E E P E E E E E E E E


   
     (7.1) 
In order to proceed to the next compounding, we need to find the reliability index of the 
compound event 1 2 1 2andE E E   (denoted by 1 2and ), and the correlation coefficient between 
the new compound event 1 2andE  and each of the remaining component events in the system. 
First, the reliability index of the compound event, 1 2and  is obtained by the use of the single-fold 
numerical integration of 1 2( )P E E  as follows (Ditlevsen and Madsen 1996). 
  1,2
1
1 2 1 2
1
1 2 2 1 2
0
[ ( )]
( ) ( ) , ;
and P E E
d



  
               

 (7.2) 
where 1  and 2  are the reliability indexes of 1E  and 2E  respectively; and 1,2  is the 
correlation coefficient between the standard normal random variables 1Z  and 2Z  which 
respectively represents 1E  and 2E . For simplicity, the correlation coefficients between 
standard normal random variables will be hereinafter termed as the correlation coefficient 
between component events. 
Next, we obtain the correlation coefficients between the new compound event 1 2andE  
and the other remaining component events in the system. Consider a triple of 1E , 2E , and kE , 
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3,...,k n  where n  is the current total number of components in the system during a 
sequential compounding process. We aim to find the correlation coefficient (1 2),and k , 3,...,k n  
that would provide the same estimate on the probability of the event 
1 1 2 2[( ) ( )] ( )p k kZ Z Z          after compounding, i.e. 
   3 1 2 1,2 1, 2, 2 1 2 (1 2),, , ; , , , ;k k k and k and k             (7.3) 
where 2 ( )   and 3( )   respectively denote the joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of the bi- and tri-variate standard normal distributions. Since all the terms in Eq. (7.3) except 
(1 2),and k  are already given, one can solve the equation for (1 2),and k  numerically by finding 
(1 2),and k  that minimizes the difference between the two CDFs by use of a nonlinear optimization 
algorithm with the constraint (1 2),1 1and k    . However, this is a time-consuming task because 
the numerical analysis would require repeated evaluations of the multi-fold integrals. 
In order to obtain the correlation coefficients efficiently, we first decompose the CDFs using 
conditional probabilities, i.e. 
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
k k k
and and k k k
P Z Z Z
P Z Z
        
     

 (7.4) 
where 1 2andZ  is the standard normal random variable representing the compound event. For 
exact evaluations, these conditional probabilities would be obtained from non-normal 
distributions (Pandey 1998), but the proposed method approximates them by the CDFs of normal 
random variables. After dividing both terms by ( )k  , Eq (7.4) is then approximated to 
 2 1| 2| 1,2| (1 2)|, ; ( )k k k and k        (7.5) 
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The conditional reliability indexes and conditional correlation coefficients given k kZ    in 
this equation are determined exactly by (Birnbaum 1950) 
 
2
1| 1 1, 1,
2
2| 2 2, 2,
2 2
1,2| 1,2 1, 2, 1, 2,
2
(1 2)| 1 2 (1 2), (1 2),
( ) / 1
β (β ρ ) / 1 ρ
ρ (ρ ρ ρ ) / 1 ρ 1 ρ
(β ρ ) / 1 ρ
k k k
k k k
k k k k k
and k and and k and k
A B
A B
B B B
A B
    
  
   
   
 (7.6) 
where ( ) / ( )k kA      ; and ( β )kB A A    in which ( )   denotes the PDF of the 
standard normal distribution. Note that the bi-variate CDF in Eq. (7.5) can be computed by a 
single-fold integral (Ditlevsen and Madsen 1996), i.e. 
   1,2|2 1| 2| 1,2| 1| 2| 2 1| 2|
0
, ; ( ) ( ) , ,
k
k k k k k k k d

                (7.7) 
In summary, Eqs. (7.5) and (7.6) have only one unknown, i.e. (1 2),ρ and k  because 1 , 2 , k , 
1,2 , 1,k  and 2,k  are available from the original component analysis or previous 
compounding processes. The efficiency of numerical analysis for obtaining (1 2),and k  is 
significantly increased by solving Eqs. (7.5) and (7.6) instead of Eq. (7.3) because it does not 
require performing any multi-fold numerical integration. At each compounding, this numerical 
analysis is performed ( 2)n  times to obtain (1 2),and k , 3,...,k n . In all the numerical 
examples in the chapter, we used a sequential quadratic programming method (Biggs 1975) to 
obtain the correlation coefficients. In order to check the accuracy of the approximate equation in 
Eqs. (7.5) and (7.6), Figure 7.1 compares the equivalent correlation coefficients obtained by Eq. 
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(7.3) and Eqs. (7.5)–(7.6) when the three components are equi-correlated, i.e. 
1,2 1, 2,k k       , and have equal reliability indexes, i.e. 1 2 k       . Close matches are 
observed at all levels of correlation and reliability indexes considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1  Comparison of equivalent correlation coefficients  (1 2),and k  obtained by exact (Eq. 
(7.3)) and approximate (Eq. (7.5)) formulations 
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7.3. Compounding Two Components Coupled by Union 
Let us consider compounding two components 1E  and 2E  coupled by union into a single 
equivalent event 1 2orE . For example, this compounding can appear in a series system or a link-
set system, and can be compounded as follows.  
1 2 10 1 2 3 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
( ) ( )
(( ) ( )) (( ) ( ))
or
or
P E E E P E E E
P E E E E E E P E E E E E


   
          (7.8) 
First, using De Morgan’s rule and the symmetry of the standard normal distribution, the 
reliability index of the compound event 1 2orE  is obtained by 
 1,2
1
1 2 1 2
1
1 2
1
1 2
1
1 2 2 1 2
0
[ ( )]
1 ( )
[ ( )]
( ) ( ) , ,
or P E E
P E E
P E E
d





  
    
 
               


  (7.9) 
Next, we aim to find the equivalent correlation coefficient (1 2),or k  that would provide the same 
estimate on the probability of the event 1 1 2 2[( ) ( )] ( )u k kZ Z Z         , after 
compounding, i.e. 
3 1 2 3 1,2 1, , 2, 2 1 2 (1 2),( , , ; , ) ( , ; )
u
k k or k or kz z z d

         z  (7.10) 
Using the same decomposition and approximation used for the intersection case, Eq. (7.10) is 
approximated as 
 2 1| 2| 1,2| (1 2)|1 , ; ( )k k k or k        (7.11) 
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where 
2
(1 2)| 1 2 (1 2), (1 2),(β ρ ) / 1 ρor k or or k or kA B     (7.12) 
The bi-variate CDF in Eq. (7.11) can be computed by performing the single-fold numerical 
integration in Eq. (7.7) with 1|k  and 2|k  replaced by 1|k  and 2|k , respectively. At each 
compounding, Eqs. (7.11) and (7.12) are solved numerically for (1 2),ρ or k , 3,...,k n  with the 
constraint (1 2),1 1   or k . Figure 7.2 compares the equivalent correlation coefficients obtained 
by Eq. (7.10) and Eqs. (7.11)–(7.12) when the three components are equi-correlated, i.e. 
1,2 1, 2,k k       , and have equal reliability indexes, i.e. 1 2 k       . Close matches are 
once again observed at all levels of correlation and reliability indexes considered.  
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Figure 7.2  Comparison of equivalent correlation coefficients (1 2),or k  obtained by exact (Eq. 
(7.10)) and approximate (Eq. (7.11)) formulations 
 
7.4. Sequential Compounding Processes 
For a parallel or series system, the procedures introduced in Section 7.2 or 7.3 can be applied to 
adjacent components sequentially until it becomes a single compound event. For a cut-set or 
link-set system, one can first compound components in each cut-set or link-set until the system 
becomes an equivalent series or parallel system, respectively. Then, the compound components 
in the series or parallel system are compounded sequentially again. One can follow alternative 
orders of compounding as long as it is compatible with event operation rules (e.g. associative 
q. (7.10) 
q. (7.11) 
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rule and commutative rule). Although each compounding process requires solving the nonlinear 
equations in Eqs. (7.5)–(7.6) or Eqs. (7.11)–(7.12) numerically for all remaining components, 
the proposed procedure is efficient because it does not involve sampling or multi-fold numerical 
integrations. It is also noteworthy that the proposed approach can be used to quantify the 
statistical dependence between sub-systems, e.g., cut-sets or link-sets by the equivalent 
correlation coefficients between the compound events. 
7.5. Numerical Examples 
7.5.1. Illustrative Example: a Link-set System with Five Components 
Consider the following link-set system event consisting of five equally reliable components with 
1i   ,  i=1,…,5: 
 1 2 3 4 5sysE E E E E E      (7.13) 
The correlation coefficient matrix of the standard normal random variables representing the five 
components is given as 
1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2
1 0.8 0.6 0.4
1 0.8 0.6
. 1 0.8
1
sym
         
R  (7.14) 
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In this example, each step of sequential compounding is shown along with the updated reliability 
index and correlation coefficients to demonstrate the proposed method. See Figure 7.3 for an 
illustration of the procedure. 
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Figure 7.3  Sequential compounding procedure for a general system with five components  
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 First, we compound the subsystem 1 2E E  into an equivalent component AE . The 
reliability index of this compound component, A  is computed as −0.773 by Eq. (7.2), and the 
system definition and correlation coefficient matrix are then updated to 
 3 4 5sys AE E E E E     (7.15) 
and 
1 . . .
1 0 8 0 6
1 0 8
1
. .
sym. .
       
0 725 0 522 0 319
R  (7.16) 
where the correlation coefficients between the new compound component and the remaining 
components (in bold) are obtained by solving Eqs. (7.5)–(7.6) numerically. 
Next, we merge the subsystem )( 43 EE   in Eq. (7.15) into a compound component BE . 
Using Eq. (7.9) in Section 7.4, the reliability index of the compound component B  is 
computed as −1.295, and the system definition and correlation coefficients are respectively 
updated to 
5sys A BE E E E     (7.17) 
and 
1 . 0.319
1 .
. 1sym
      
0 651
R 0 729  (7.18) 
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where the correlation coefficients between the compound event BE  and the other events (in 
bold) are computed by solving Eqs. (7.11)–(7.12) numerically. The original system event in Eq. 
(7.13) is now transformed to a parallel system with three components AE , BE  and 5E . 
By applying the procedure in Section 7.2 two more times, the system in Eq. (7.17) 
becomes a single compound event ( DE  in Figure 7.3). As a result, the system failure probability 
( )sysP E  is computed as 0.671 which is fairly close to 0.673 by a Monte Carlo simulation with 
810  samples. 
7.5.2. Parallel System Consisting of 10 Components with Equal Reliability Indexes and Equal 
Correlation Coefficients 
The proposed approach is applied to a parallel system consisting of 10 components with the 
equal reliability indexes, i.e. , 1, 2,...,10i i     and equal correlation coefficients , 0.5,i j   
i j . The probabilities computed by the proposed method are compared to those by the PCM 
method (Pandey 1998) which is known as an efficient and reasonably accurate method for 
evaluating multivariate normal integrals for series and parallel systems. Due to the equal 
correlation coefficients, the exact solution can be obtained by a single fold numerical integration 
employing the Dunnett-Sobel class correlation model (Dunnett and Sobel 1955), i.e. 
0.5( ) ( )
1 0.5
N
sys
sP E s ds


             (7.19) 
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where 10N  . Figure 7.4 and Table 7.1 show the comparison as the equal component reliability 
index   varies from −3 to 3. Both methods provide quite accurate results while the proposed 
method shows slightly better accuracy overall. 
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Figure 7.4  Comparison of the proposed method and the PCM for parallel systems consisting 
of 10 components with equal reliability indexes and equal correlation coefficients 
 
Table 7.1  Comparison of the proposed method with PCM for parallel systems consisting of 10 
components with equal reliability indexes and equal correlation coefficients 
  −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 
Exact 9.890×10–1 8.669×10–1 4.606×10–1 9.091×10–2 4.791×10–3 5.658×10–5 1.361×10–7 
Proposed method 9.884×10–1 8.658×10–1 4.621×10–1 9.238×10–2 5.013×10–3 6.158×10–5 1.549×10–7 
PCM 9.878×10–1 8.628×10–1 4.697×10–1 9.332×10–2 4.552×10–3 4.735×10–5 9.982×10–8 
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7.5.3. Parallel System Consisting of 10 Components with Equal Reliability Indexes but 
Unequal Correlation Coefficients 
Consider a parallel system with 10 components having equal reliability indexes but their unequal 
correlation coefficients are determined by 
, 1 , , 1, ,1010 1i j
i j
i j
      (7.20) 
The system probabilities are computed by the proposed method, the PCM method, and the MSR 
method using one, two and three CSRVs. The MSR method requires numerical integration whose 
dimension is the same as the number of CSRVs while the accuracy of the MSR method gradually 
enhances with the number of CSRVs increased. Since there is no closed form solution available 
for this example, we perform Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) with 810  samples for each case. 
The results in Figure 7.5 show that the proposed method has a good agreement with the MCS 
results for the entire range of the reliability index considered. 
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Figure 7.5  Comparison of the proposed method, the PCM and MSR method for parallel 
systems consisting of 10 components with equal reliability indexes but unequal 
correlation coefficients 
 
7.5.4. Cut-set System Consisting of 10 Components with Equal Reliability Indexes but Unequal 
Correlation Coefficients 
Consider the following cut-set system consisting of the components used in the previous 
example: 
1 2 3 4 9 10...sysE E E E E E E     (7.21) 
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Figure 7.6 compares the results by the proposed method with those by the MSR method and 
MCS (108 samples). It is noted that most existing methods for multivariate normal integral 
including the PCM method are developed only for parallel or series systems, thus cannot be used 
for this cut-set system. The proposed method provides the results that are close to those by MCS 
and its accuracy is even better than that of the MSR using three CSRVs. 
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Figure 7.6  Comparison of the proposed method, the PCM and MSR method for cut-set 
systems consisting of 10 components with equal reliability indexes but unequal 
correlation coefficients 
 
134 
 
7.5.5. Parallel System Consisting of 10 Components with Unequal Reliability Indexes and 
Unequal Correlation Coefficients 
Consider a parallel system with 10 components having the equal correlation coefficients 0.5 
except 1,5 2,4 0.4     and 1,7 2,6 3,5 0.9      . The unequal reliability indexes of the 10 
components are given by ,9/)224(  ii  .10,...,1i  For this example, the MSR and PCM 
method show significant errors, as shown in Table 7.2. By contrast, the proposed method shows a 
good agreement with the MCS result (108 samples).  
 
Table 7.2  Comparison of the existing methods and the proposed method for a parallel system 
with unequal reliability indexes and unequal correlation coefficients 
 Proposed method MSR (3 CSRVs) PCM MCS 
Probability (×10–3) 4.585 3.613 2.373 4.480 
 
7.5.6. Parallel System Consisting of 5~50 Components with Equal Reliability Indexes and 
Equal Correlation Coefficients 
In order to examine the potential effect of the system size on the performance of the proposed 
method, we consider parallel systems with 5~50 components having the equal reliability indexes 
(  1, 2 or 3) and equal correlation coefficients 0.5. The exact solution can be obtained by Eq. 
(7.19) as N  is varied from 5 to 50. As shown by the results in Figure 7.7, in contrast to the 
PCM, the proposed method does not show significant error accumulation as the system size 
increases. Although the proposed method is not as efficient as the PCM method, it requires 
affordable computational cost. For example, it requires 14 seconds for a 50-component system 
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by Matlab® on a personal computer with AMD dual core 2.0 GHz. The accuracy and efficiency 
of the proposed method can be further improved by using a numerical solver with higher-
performance in computing equivalent correlation coefficients. 
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Figure 7.7  Comparison of the proposed method and the PCM for parallel systems consisting of 
5~50 components with equal reliability indexes and equal correlation coefficients 
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7.5.7. Series System Consisting of 10~100 Components with Equal Reliability Indexes and 
Equal Correlation Coefficients 
The size effect is examined for series systems as well. Consider series systems having 10~100 
components having the equal reliability indexes (  1, 2 or 3) and equal correlation coefficients 
0.5. The exact solution of this problem can be obtained by  
0.5( ) 1 1 ( )
1 0.5
N
sys
sP E s ds


                 
  (7.22) 
where N  is varied from 10 to 100. Figure 7.8 confirms that the size effect of the proposed 
method is negligible in contrast to the PCM method. This example uses an improved version of 
the PCM method (IPCM) (Yuan and Pandey 2006) that was developed for more accurate 
evaluation of multivariate normal integrals of series systems. 
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Figure 7.8  Performance of the proposed method for series systems consisting of 10~100 
components with equal reliability indexes and equal correlation coefficients 
 
7.5.8. Cut-set System Consisting of 100~1,000 Components with Equal Reliability Indexes and 
Equal Correlation Coefficients 
Consider the following cut-set system having the equal reliability indexes (  1, 2 or 3) and 
equal correlation coefficients 0.5: 
1 2 3 4 1...sys N NE E E E E E E     (7.23) 
The exact solution of this problem can be obtained by  
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/22
0.5( ) 1 1 ( )
1 0.5
N
sys
sP E s ds


                 
  (7.24) 
As shown in Figure 7.9, the results by the proposed method show good agreement with the exact 
solutions. 
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Figure 7.9  Performance of the proposed method for cut-set systems consisting of 100~1,000 
components with equal reliability indexes and equal correlation coefficients 
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Chapter 8  Conclusions 
8.1. Summary of Major Findings 
This thesis developed two system reliability analysis methods, termed the Matrix-based System 
Reliability (MSR) Method and the Sequential Compounding Method (SCM). The methods were 
applied to risk assessment of complex structural systems and lifeline networks. The MSR method 
was further developed to achieve improved efficiency using the first- or second-order reliability 
method; and to evaluate the sensitivity of the system failure probability with respect to 
parameters that affect the statistical dependence between the components. This thesis also 
developed new methods for stochastic damage detection of pipeline networks based on the MSR 
method. This study provided the following major findings: 
 The MSR method can compute the probabilities of general system events efficiently by 
simple matrix operations. Both the system event and the likelihoods of the component 
events are described by vectors constructed through efficient matrix-based procedures. 
The method is uniformly applicable to any type of system events including series, parallel, 
cut-set and link-set systems. The matrix-based framework also allows for the narrowest 
bounds on the system probability by linear programming when one has incomplete 
information. Also, the MSR method can estimate various importance measures and 
conditional probabilities without additional probability computations. Even when the 
sources of the statistical dependence between components are not explicitly identified, 
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one can use the MSR method by fitting the correlation coefficient matrix that represents 
the statistical dependence among component events by a generalized Dunnett-Sobel class 
correlation model. Matrix-based procedures are developed to calculate the sensitivities of 
the probability of general system event with respect to design parameters based on 
component reliability sensitivities. 
 The MSR method can be applied to general systems with various merits as demonstrated 
by three numerical examples. The first example was a bridge network in which the MSR 
method estimated the probabilities of various system events such as the disconnection of 
cities and counties from a hospital. The probability distribution of the number of failed 
bridges and conditional probabilities were also obtained by the proposed method. The 
example also demonstrated the ability of the MSR method to estimate narrow bounds on 
the system failure probability in spite of the lack of complete information. The second 
example was a bridge system in which the MSR method was used to compute the system 
fragility, other important system probabilities, and component importance measures. The 
third example was a statically indeterminate truss structure in which the MSR method 
was used to compute the probability of a progressive failure of and the sensitivity with 
respect to the means and standard deviations of uncertain member capacities. The 
example also demonstrated a systematic decision-making procedure based on the system 
reliability sensitivities by the MSR method and the changes in the design parameters that 
can be achieved by a given limited budget. 
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 The Sequential Compounding Method (SCM) can evaluate multivariate normal integrals 
defined for general systems efficiently and accurately. It sequentially compounds 
components in a general system event until the system becomes one compound event. An 
important merit of the SCM is that one can quantify the statistical dependence between 
subsystems by the equivalent correlation coefficients between compound events. The 
SCM’s accuracy and efficiency for series, parallel, cut-set and link-set systems were 
demonstrated through comparison with other existing methods such as the Product of 
Conditional Marginals PCM method and MSR method in various numerical examples. It 
was also confirmed that the accuracy of the method is not significantly affected by the 
large number of components in a system. Due to its wide applicability, accuracy and 
efficiency, the method is expected to enhance the computational capability in various 
system reliability analysis applications.  
 The MSR method can efficiently evaluate multinormal integrals for general systems and 
their parameter sensitivities. In order to perform the multi-fold integrals more efficiently 
in the space of common source random variables (CSRVs) that are identified through DS 
fitting, the MSR method was integrated with first order and second order reliability 
methods (FORM/SORM). A hypothetical system example and an application to a three-
story Daniels system indicated that the error by FORM was significant while the MSR 
analysis could be performed efficiently and accurately by the use of SORM. The MSR 
method was further developed to obtain the sensitivities of the system failure probability 
with respect to parameters that affect the correlation coefficients between the components. 
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Using the procedure and derivations developed for obtaining the parameter sensitivities 
of the DS model and the correlation coefficients, one could estimate the parameter 
sensitivities of the system failure probabilities efficiently and accurately. This was 
demonstrated by a finite element system reliability analysis of a bridge pylon structure. 
 Two efficient system reliability methods were developed to facilitate post-disaster 
damage detection for water pipeline networks. First, the matrix-based system reliability 
method was further developed for efficient uncertainty quantification of system quantities 
such as water flows. Second, a Bayesian method was developed to compute the 
conditional probabilities of component damage given post-disaster network flow 
observations. The developed methods were successfully applied to a water pipe network 
consisting of 15 pipelines. The results of system uncertainty quantification by the first 
method showed good agreement with those by Monte Carlo Simulations. The efficient 
stochastic system damage detection method identified the same critical components as 
full vector calculations, which were done by use of a supercomputer due to its 
exceedingly large computational cost. The results demonstrated the high efficiency and 
reasonable accuracy of the proposed method while Monte Carlo simulations were not 
able to detect components with high probabilities of damage despite large computational 
cost. The proposed methods and framework are applicable not only to water pipe 
networks but also to other complex systems. Further study is needed for investigating the 
impact of model errors on stochastic damage detection and for rapid post-disaster 
decision makings on a variety of lifeline networks. 
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8.2. Future Research Topics 
The proposed methods can be further developed for more accurate and efficient risk assessment 
as well as more practical applications of infrastructures. The following future research topics are 
suggested: 
 Apply the MSR framework to time varying structural reliability problems. In reality, the 
reliability of structural systems should be estimated by considering time-varying failure 
modes, loadings, and load-carrying capacity of members. However, the current MSR was 
formulated to deal with a single time point or discrete time points. The matrix 
calculations of MSR can be expanded to handle multiple or continuous time points for 
rendering these time-varying system behaviors such as deterioration of infrastructures.   
 Estimate the reliability of large networks and structural systems using multi-scale 
approach. Their failure events are represented by multiple failure locations, modes, 
components, and correlations. All of the information should be stored in very large size 
matrixes in the MSR framework and it often causes a memory issue. Multi-scale 
approaches or decomposition methods need to be investigated to reduce the size of the 
matrixes and memory usage. Song and Ok (2010) used this concept for the reliability 
analysis of lifeline networks under earthquake hazards.     
 Improve the efficiency of SCM further using advanced optimization algorithms. 
Although the current SCM can handle very large size system reliability problems 
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efficiently as demonstrated by a wide range of numerical examples, it can be even further 
improved by adopting advanced nonlinear optimization algorithms which estimate the 
correlations between components or sub-systems more rapidly. This is very important for 
performing near-real-time risk estimations and decision making after a hazard event 
occurs.    
 Develop SCM for estimating sensitivities of system reliability with respect to component 
reliabilities which are required for optimal designs such as the System Reliability Based 
Design or Topology Optimization (SRBDO or SRBTO). The high efficiency of SCM will 
be essential for this purpose, since a large number of iterations are inevitable for optimal 
designs.  
 Apply the Bayesian stochastic damage detection method to health monitoring problems 
with continuous damage states. Continuous damage states can be approximated by 
discrete damage states, and their optimal number and degree will be obtained 
systematically by the selective expansion scheme. Also, it can be used for simple 
representation of large networks or structural systems by representing unimportant 
components to be deterministic.     
 Apply the Bayesian stochastic damage detection method to the health monitoring of 
general systems such as buildings, infrastructures, mechanical systems, and networks, 
which only allow a limited locations of observations. Asymptotic optimizations can be 
used to predict the damage locations and corresponding damage severities in systems in a 
stochastic manner. Also they can be used to identify the optimal number and locations of 
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sensors, the desired level of measurement error in the sensors, and the preferred level of a 
model, by simulating various sensor configurations in varying numbers. 
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